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TRACING BASIS THROUGH VIRTUAL SPACES
Adam Chodorowt
Whether and to what extent virtual income should be subject to tax has
received recent interest from both tax scholars and governments. Options
range from a pure cash-out rule, where virtual income is taxed only if it is
exchanged for real-world currency or property, to a rule of full taxation,
where in-world transactions are taxed to the same extent as similar real-world
transactions. To date, the IRS has remained silent on this issue, creating a
de facto cash-out rule. The National Taxpayer Advocate has recently called
on the IRS to provide guidance regarding the taxation of virtual income, lest
taxpayers become inadvertent tax cheats and noncompliance in this area af-
fect compliance more generally.
This Article addresses a question that must be resolved regardless of the
approach ultimately chosen, namely, how to account for the tax basis in
virtual items. Current law generally takes one of two approaches to basis
recovery: The first considers each item of property separately, affording each
piece of property its own basis. The second treats property on an aggregate
basis and allows for the pooling and averaging of basis. After reviewing the
existing approaches, I conclude that the nature of virtual worlds warrants a
hybrid approach, where the basis in individual virtual goods is separately
tracked, but the basis in fungible currency is pooled and averaged.
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INTRODUCTION
With the rise of virtual worlds, debate has erupted regarding
whether or how best to tax wealth generated in such worlds. A con-
sensus exists for the proposition that those who "cash out," i.e., con-
vert virtual wealth to real-world wealth, should be taxed on their
gains.' The question of whether, and to what extent, activity that oc-
curs entirely within virtual worlds should be taxed is more difficult.
Some argue that all in-world activity should be exempt from tax,2
while others have argued for taxation under certain circumstances,
using a variety of theories to justify their positions.3
Congress'sJoint Economic Committee has taken up the question,
but it has yet to issue a report. However, Representative James Saxton,
the Chairman and ranking Republican member of the Committee,
has stated that it would be a "mistake" for the IRS to tax income
1 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2, 45 (2007); Leandra Lederman, "Stranger than Fiction": Taxing Virtual
Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1620, 1625 (2007).
2 See Camp, supra note 1, at 2. Camp argues that virtual income should be seen as a
form of imputed income and should therefore be exempt from tax under current doctrine
and theory until cashed out. Id. However, he concedes that at some point the walls be-
tween virtual spaces and the real world may deteriorate to the point where nontaxation is
no longer appropriate. See id. at 70.
3 See, e.g., Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Virtual Income, 75 TENN.
L. REv. 695, 743-52 (2008). I argue that the taxability of virtual income should depend on
whether participants are able to cash out their virtual wealth. In worlds that preclude
cashing out, no tax should be due until participants do in fact cash out (most likely in
violation of the world's rules). In worlds that permit participants to cash out, tax logic
suggests that taxes should be owed on all income. However, I argue for an annual de
minimis threshold of $600, under which no tax should be due. See id.; see also Steven
Chung, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce, 28 VA. TAx REv. 733, 763 (2009) (arguing that
income in commodified worlds such as Second Life should be taxed and that one should
use the foreign currency rules found in SubpartJ of the international tax provisions of the
Code to determine gains and losses); Leandra Lederman, EBay's Second Life: When Should
Virtual Earnings Bear Real Taxes?, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 136, 140 (2009) (arguing that
the government should treat virtual currency in Second Life as a cash equivalent and tax
sales and purchases for such currency accordingly); Theodore P. Seto, When Is a Game Only
a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (2009) (arguing that taxa-
tion should depend upon whether virtual goods are either convertible or redeemable);
William D. Terando et al., Taxation Policy in Virtual Worlds: Issues Raised by Second Life and
Other Unstructured Games, 6 J. LEGAL TAx Ras. 94, 107 (2008) (arguing that exchanges in
"commodified" worlds create income, but that participants should be allowed to defer tax
until they cash out).
In contrast, Lederman argues for a bifurcated approach based on the type of world
involved and the type of transaction. She would exempt from tax all virtual income earned
in "game worlds" and tax only sales-but not barter transactions-in worlds such as Sec-
ond Life. Lederman, supra note 1.
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earned solely within the confines of virtual space. 4 To date, the IRS
has remained silent regarding this issue, creating a de facto cash-out
rule.5 Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, recently noted
this lack of guidance and suggested that "[e]conomic activities associ-
ated with virtual worlds may present an emerging area of [tax] non-
compliance."6 Concerned that noncompliance in this context could
lead to noncompliance elsewhere, and concerned with the lack of gui-
dance afforded IRS agents and taxpayers alike, she has urged the IRS
to "help taxpayers comply with their tax obligations by quickly issuing
guidance addressing how to report economic activities in virtual
worlds."7
This Article examines one of the issues the taxing authorities
must address, and soon. Regardless of what decision is ultimately
made regarding in-world transactions, tax authorities must deal with
the question of basis and how to trace it through virtual spaces. With-
out such a system, someone who sells a virtual item for cash, an act
that is undisputedly subject to tax, will not be able to determine gain
or loss and therefore will be unable to comply with his tax obligations.
If in-world transactions are taxable, the need to determine basis be-
comes even more important as a substantially larger number of trans-
actions involving virtual items will have real-world tax consequences.
It may be tempting to think that this issue is just a tempest in a
teapot and not something on which the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) should spend its limited resources. However, the real-world
market for virtual goods is large and growing as existing worlds ex-
pand and new virtual worlds come online. By one recent estimate, the
gross domestic product of all virtual worlds is somewhere between $7
and $12 billion, with annual real-world sales of virtual goods (e.g., tax-
able sales of virtual goods for real-world currency) estimated to be
4 Robert Janelle, Taxing Virtual Income, SUITElOLCoM, Oct. 24, 2006, http://video
games.suiteI01.com/article.cfm/taxing-virtualincome.
5 See 1 NINA OLSON, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 214 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08-tas arc-intro-toc-msp.
pdf (discussing the lack of guidance by the IRS in this area). In contrast, several countries,
including Australia and Sweden, have begun to take steps to tax virtual income. See Posting
of Wagner James Au to GigaOM, http://gigaom.com/2006/11/02/the-virtual-world-
taxman-arriveth-in-oz/ (Nov. 2, 2006) (describing the Australian tax authority's statement
that virtual income will be subject to tax under the same principles as other kinds of in-
come); Posting of Dan Miller to Economies of Virtual Worlds, http://economicsofvirtual
worlds.blogspot.com/2008/04/sweden-to-tax-virtual-income.html (Apr. 21, 2008) (indicat-
ing that if virtual currency can be converted to real-world currency, in-world transactions
by Swedish citizens may be subject to both the value added tax, if sales exceed approxi-
mately $5000, and the income tax); see also Flora Graham, Slapping a Tax on Playtime, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7746094.stm (discussing
new efforts by China, South Korea, and Sweden to impose tax consequences on virtual
transactions).
6 OLSON, supra note 5, at 215.
7 Id. at 224.
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around $1.8 billion. 8 If the past is any guide, it seems likely that more
and more real-world activity will take place in these fora, further weak-
ening the boundaries between virtual- and real-world activities and
strengthening the case for in-world taxation. As virtual worlds in-
crease in popularity and the boundaries between them and the real
world weaken, the need to develop basis rules for virtual worlds will
only increase.
Addressing basis in this new context also affords us the opportu-
nity to think broadly about basis, the role it plays in our tax system,
and the myriad and often inconsistent ways we account for it in our
tax laws. Any basis-recovery system must do two things: First, it must
track previously taxed dollars such that any tax gain or loss matches
economic gain or loss. Second, it must take into account administra-
tive difficulties, such as determining basis ab initio, keeping track of
fungible assets with different bases, and accounting for the possibility
of numerous tax-free exchanges before tax must be determined.
These administrative concerns are heightened in the virtual-world
context because of the low values involved and the large number of
people who are simply playing for their own entertainment. 9
The Internal Revenue Code (Code or I.R.C.) and Department of
Treasury regulations contain a number of different basis-recovery
rules that could be models for the recovery of basis in virtual goods.
Generally, these rules follow one of two approaches. The first grants
each item its own basis, and gain or loss is determined property by
property. In the event of tax-free exchanges, basis is simply trans-
ferred from one asset to the next to preserve gain or loss. The key
issue under this approach is whether taxpayers may designate which
assets are sold or exchanged for other assets or whether some forced-
ordering rule applies. Examples of this regime include the rules gov-
erning stock sales, tax-free reorganizations, and inventory accounting.
The second approach pools basis and allocates it across a class of as-
sets. Examples include partnership interests, mutual fund shares, and
the allocation of basis to stock in corporation formations under I.R.C.
§ 351.
8 Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES MAc., June 17, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?r=-I &
ex=1 184817600&en=53bc942a077f47d6&ei=5070&oref=slogin.
9 Under the current default rule, tax liability arises only when someone cashes out.
It is not clear how many people playing for entertainment are occasional sellers or whether
they would continue to play if in-world transactions were subject to tax. However, the
scope, nature, and extent of virtual worlds is constantly changing, and part of this project is
to encourage the IRS to create broadly applicable rules now-when it can act deliber-
ately-rather than in the shadow of some controversy or political maelstrom that might
affect its reasoning.
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A review of these different models and the circumstances in
which they apply reveals the incoherent and instrumental nature of
the basis rules. That is, these rules are not foreordained by some in-
ternal tax logic, but rather they are merely a tool that can be designed
in any number of ways to avoid double taxation. Moreover, as seen in
the different treatment of stock and mutual fund shares, they are not
applied consistently. This inconsistency opens the door to any num-
ber of possibilities when designing basis rules for virtual worlds.
Given the nature of virtual worlds and characteristics of those
who participate in them, I propose that the IRS adopt a hybrid rule
for basis accounting. To reflect the nonfungible nature of virtual
goods, their basis should be separately tracked and treated. If in-
world exchanges are tax free, basis should transfer from one item to
the next to preserve gain or loss. 10 If in-world exchanges are taxed,
the basis in any item received should be its fair market value. In con-
trast, a taxpayer's basis in virtual currency should be pooled and aver-
aged, reflecting the fungible nature of such goods and the
administrative difficulties associated with tracing basis from a commin-
gled pool of currency to any item acquired with such currency.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides
a brief description of virtual reality. Part II provides a brief discussion
of the debate regarding the taxability of in-world transactions. It then
provides an introduction to basis. Finally, it describes the basis prob-
lem that virtual worlds present by exploring how basis in virtual goods
is created and then demonstrating the need for a basis accounting
rule, regardless of the tax rule adopted for in-world transactions.
Part III describes the possible models for basis recovery currently
used in a number of different contexts, including sales of stock, mu-
tual fund shares, partnership interests, and inventories, as well as the
tax treatment of basis in tax-free exchanges. Part IV considers how
the basis-recovery models found in the existing tax laws might work in
the virtual context and explores how the nature of virtual reality
might affect the choice of a rule. In the end, it describes a hybrid
approach that seeks to incorporate the best elements of the tracing
and pooling approaches.
I
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF VIRTUAL WORLDS
In this Part, I briefly describe virtual worlds. A basic understand-
ing of such worlds is necessary to understand the tax issues they en-
10 In some cases, virtual goods may be fungible. Multiple copies of the same item
often exist in virtual worlds, and they may even be owned by one person. However, virtual
goods are not fungible in the same way as virtual currency in that virtual swords are not
fungible with virtual shields.
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gender. Each world is different, and, therefore, this description is
necessarily general. I I
Virtual worlds are online spaces that permit people to interact
with one another through characters they create, often called avatars.
Unlike video games, virtual worlds do not pause or end when a user
exits. 12 Instead, virtual life continues, and a returning player may well
discover that things have changed significantly since she last visited
the world. Most worlds have a virtual economy, where players can
make, find, win, buy, sell, rent, and exchange virtual goods. 13
Virtual worlds exist on a continuum but can generally be broken
into two categories. At one end of the continuum are game worlds, 14
which are highly scripted environments where the game's creator pro-
vides a rich environment with scenery, preset roles, plotlines, rules for
interaction, etc.15 Players complete quests and search for treasure,
often joining together with other players to do so. As players acquire
more virtual currency, property, and experience within a game world,
they are able to do more within the context of the game, often rising
to a new "level" and undertaking more difficult quests. 16
The main point of most game worlds is to enjoy the game. Ac-
cordingly, creators typically oversee player activity to ensure people do
not ruin the environment for others or otherwise damage the game's
integrity. 17 Developers generally reserve the right to kick out disrup-
tive players, purport to retain all property rights in the virtual goods
created, and often restrict players' abilities to exchange virtual items
11 This description is taken in part from Chodorow, supra note 3, at 699-704. For a
more complete description of the historical developments leading to the creation of virtual
worlds, as well as a description of the variety of virtual worlds, see F. Gregory Lastowka &
Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4-14 (2004); see also Camp,
supra note 1, at 3-8; Lederman, supra note 1, at 1625-30.
12 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 11, at 5-6.
13 See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on
the Cyberian Frontier 26-29 (CESifo Working Papers, Paper No. 618, 2001), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/abstract=294828 (describing the microeconomic conditions in the vir-
tual world of Norrath); see also Bryn Davies, Sustainable Economics, Price Arbitrage, Infor-
mation Asymmetry and Elastic & Inelastic Markets in a World of Warcraft Economy, http:/
/www.progsoc.org/-curious/economics.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing the
exchanges that take place in World of Warcraft).
14 I borrow the terms "game world" and "unscripted world" from Lederman. Leder-
man, supra note 1, at 1628-31. Some use different terminology to describe the different
types of worlds. For instance, Camp differentiates between "structured" and "unstruc-
tured" worlds, where structured corresponds roughly to "game worlds," while unstructured
games correspond to "unscripted" worlds. Camp, supra note 1, at 4-8.
15 Examples of game worlds include World of Warcraft, EverQuest, Lineage, City of
Heroes, Dark Age of Camelot, and Ultima Online.
16 See Camp, supra note 1, at 6.
17 This behavior is not strictly limited to game worlds. See, e.g., Welcome to There,
What is There?: Info for Parents, http://www.there.com/parentInfo.html#5 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2009) (describing profanity filters available in the virtual environment There).
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outside the context of the world. 18 Despite such restrictions, people
can and do buy and sell items on sites such as Itembay.ca 9 and IGE.
com.20 Indeed, in a practice known as "gold farming," some players
acquire virtual goods and sell them to others too impatient to work
through the game to garner the virtual wealth and experience neces-
sary to play at advanced levels. 2 1
At the other end of the continuum are unscripted worlds, which
make available spaces for people to interact without providing any set
story line or activities. 22 As a result, these worlds grow according to
the tastes and inclinations of those who participate. Almost all of the
goods in unscripted worlds are self-created, i.e., made by those who
participate from constituent building blocks made available in the
given world. 23 Because unscripted worlds are often designed to facili-
tate commerce, creators of such worlds tend to grant users signifi-
cantly greater rights in their creations than is typical in game worlds. 24
Indeed, Second Life operates the LindeX, an official exchange that
facilitates the purchase and sale of virtual currency.25
Several worlds, such as Everquest, lie somewhere along the con-
tinuum, containing features of both game worlds and unscripted
worlds.26 Although many people spend time in virtual worlds as an
escape from reality, a number of these worlds are beginning to look
more and more like alternate forums to conduct real-world activities.
For instance, a host of businesses, including Nissan, IBM, and Nike,
have established a presence in Second Life.27 Numerous universities
18 See, e.g., World of Warcraft Harassment Policy, http://us.blizzard.com/support/ar-
ticle.xml?locale=enUS&articleld=20226&parentCategoryld&pageNumber= &categoryld=
2415 (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
19 Itembay, http://www.itembay.ca/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
20 IGE, http://www.ige.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
21 See Dibbell, supra note 8.
22 Examples of unscripted worlds include Second Life, The Sims Online, and There.
23 Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User Created Content and Building the
Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 81, 87-88 (2004).
24 See, e.g., Second Life Terms of Service, § 3.02, http://secondlife.com/corporate/
tos.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (permitting users to retain copyright in any content
they create in Second Life).
25 In addition to the LindeX, unofficial exchanges also exist. Linden Labs monitors
the exchange rate and maintains a fairly constant rate of around 270 Linden dollars to 1
U.S. dollar. See Camp, supra note 1, at 13, for a discussion of the LindeX and other
exchanges.
26 Everquest is a highly scripted world, but it permits and even encourages partici-
pates to cash out their virtual income.
27 SeeAllison Enright, How the Second Half Lives, MARKETING NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, us.il.
yimg.com/us.yimg.com/i/adv2/pdf/brainfood/second_life.pdf (describing the in-world
marketing efforts of companies such as IBM, Dell, Reebok, and Nike); Rachael Konrad,
IBM to Open Islands in Virtual World, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2006, http://usatoday.com/tech/
news/2006-12-13ibm-second-life-x.htm (describing how IBM established twelve islands in
Second Life for users to visit); Games Brands Play, http://gamesbrandsplay.com/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing Nissan's marketing of the Sentra in Second Life).
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have set up virtual sites to promote themselves and to allow students
to interact. 28 Even politicians have established virtual presences. 29
Reports abound of students forgoing real-world summer jobs to earn
their spending money online.30
II
THE TAX ISSUES RAISED BY VIRTUAL WORLDS
The rise of virtual worlds presents a number of tax issues. The
question that has garnered the most attention and generated the most
heat is whether the receipt of virtual income should give rise to real-
world tax liability. Less sexy, but no less important, is the question of
how one should account for basis. Although this Article focuses pri-
marily on the basis question, this Part begins with a brief overview of
the debate over whether in-world transactions should create real-
world tax liability, as the resolution of this issue may affect one's think-
ing on the best way to resolve the basis question. This Part then pro-
vides a brief description of basis and the role it plays in our income
tax before describing the basis problems raised by virtual worlds.
A. In-World Transactions
Over the past several years, people have begun to amass signifi-
cant virtual wealth, which has significant real-world value. At least two
people have been reported to have virtual wealth valued at over $1
million in U.S. currency.3 1 Numerous college students have forgone
traditional summer jobs to work online earning virtual income, with
28 See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, Business and Education Test Online Virtual World's Real-
World Potential, Wis. RAPIDS TRIB., Nov. 16, 2007 (predicting that the University of Arizona
would have an operational Second Life site by the end of 2007).
29 See Christine Lagorio, Running for President in a Virtual World, CBSNEWS.coM, Apr.
3, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/02/politics/main2639476.shtml, and
the accompanying photo essay of the virtual headquarters of the different candidates.
30 See Alexandra Alter, My Virtual Summer Job, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2008, at WI
(presenting profiles of seven young entrepreneurs who made real cash in virtual worlds);
Neha Tiwari, Teen Pays Siblings' College Fees by Selling Virtual Weapons, CNET, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://news.com.com/8301-10784_3-6124572-7.html (describing how a high school stu-
dent made $35,000 by playing Entropia Universe); see also Champion Gamer NEVERDIE Rakes
in $100,000 USD in Virtual Reality, MARKET WiNE, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.marketwire.
com/2.0/release.do?id=696685&sourceType=1 (explaining how a player named
NEVERDIE was able to recoup his $100,000 investment in Entropia Universe within eight
months).
31 In 2006, Business Week reported on Second Life's first millionaire. See Rob Hof,
Second Life's First Millionaire, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/
the.thread/techbeat/archives/2006/11/secondjlifes-fi.html (referring to the value in
U.S. currency of the player's virtual wealth); see also David Naylor, Technology, Media &
Telecoms: A Virtual Reality, LEGAL WEEK, June 7, 2007, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-
week/analysis/l172062/technology-media-telecoms-a-virtual-reality (reporting that an-
other Second Life participant claimed to have made over $1 million from an initial $10
investment).
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one student reportedly earning $35,000 over a four-year period.32
Consensus exists for the proposition that those who cash out their vir-
tual wealth should be subject to tax. 33 Whether to tax the mere re-
ceipt of virtual income is more difficult.
This issue has raised a vigorous academic debate. For instance,
Bryan Camp argues that virtual income left in-world represents a form
of imputed income and therefore should not be subject to tax, regard-
less of the type of world or activity in which a taxpayer engages.3 4 In
contrast, Leandra Lederman has argued that the taxation of virtual
income should depend on the type of world and type of transaction
undertaken therein. To avoid a purported double tax on consump-
tion, Lederman would exempt all income earned in game worlds and
tax only sales (but not barter transactions) in Second Life.35
Theodore Seto and I have separately argued, but for different
reasons, that a taxpayer's ability to cash out should be the determin-
ing factor.36 In worlds that permit participants to cash out, such as
Second Life, we contend that the receipt of virtual income should be a
taxable event, whereas in worlds that preclude their participants from
cashing out, taxation is inappropriate. 37
Several countries, including Australia and Sweden, have begun to
take steps to tax in-world transactions, although the details are some-
what unclear. 38 According to a spokesperson for the Australian Tax
Office, "'Your [virtual] income will not be treated any differently than
if you earned it working nine to five in an office.'- 39 Similarly, in Swe-
den, "in-game transactions may incur liability for both value-added tax
as well as income tax under Swedish law."40
In contrast, the IRS has not sought to tax in-world transactions,
creating a de facto cash-out rule. Despite the National Taxpayer Ad-
vocate's recent call for guidance regarding the proper treatment of
32 See Tiwari, supra note 30.
33 See sources cited supra note 1.
34 Camp, supra note 1, at 2.
35 Lederman, supra note 3; Lederman, supra note 1.
36 Chodorow, supra note 3; Seto, supra note 3. This is the approach that the Swedish
tax authorities have adopted. See Miller, supra note 5.
37 To account for administrative issues associated with taxing virtual income, I have
proposed a de minimis rule that would exempt from taxation annual virtual income below
$600. Moreover, I argue that the initial conclusion regarding taxation based on the ability
to cash out can and in some cases should be overridden by concerns over tax evasion and
administrative costs. Chodorow, supra note 3, at 746.
38 Graham, supra note 5; Au, supra note 5.
39 Nick Miller, Virtual World: Taxman Cometh, THE AGE, Oct. 31, 2006, http://www.the
age.com.au/news/biztech/virtual-world-tax-man-cometh/2 0 0 6 /10/30/1162056925483.
html.
40 Posting of Vili Lehdonvirta to Virtual Economy Research Network, http://virtual-




virtual income, the IRS has resisted, choosing instead to remain silent
on the issue.41 Thus, taxpayers and IRS agents alike are left on their
own to decide which transactions lead to taxable income and which
do not.
B. The Basis Problem
Regardless of how the in-world transaction issue is ultimately re-
solved, taxpayers and authorities must contend with the question of
basis and how to track it through virtual worlds. If in-world transac-
tions remain tax free, taxpayers will need to be able to determine basis
when they cash out so that they may calculate their gains or losses. If
some or all in-world transactions are taxable, the need to determine
basis will arise regardless of whether virtual-world participants cash
out. Tax authorities have a number of different models they could
adopt for this purpose. 42 However, before delving into these models,
it may help to begin with a brief review of basis and the role it plays in
the income-tax system and then explore a number of scenarios that
illustrate the difficulties for determining basis that virtual worlds pose.
1. A Brief Introduction to Basis and Basis Recovery
One of the key tenets of any income tax is the notion that income
should be taxed once, and only once, in the hands of the same tax-
payer.43 It is for this reason that I.R.C. § 61(a) (3) includes only gains
derived from dealings in property and not the full amount realized. 44
The rules regarding basis and basis recovery found throughout the
Code and regulations are designed to allow taxpayers to track their
previously taxed income, thus allowing them to calculate their gains
and losses, precluding the double taxation of income or receipt of a
double benefit in relation to property they own. 45
Basis may be created or acquired in a number of different ways.
As it reflects one's after-tax investment in property, generally, basis is
an item's cost.46 Thus, if a taxpayer purchases a car for $10,000 with
funds that were previously subject to tax, he will have a $10,000 basis
41 See OLSON, supra note 5.
42 See infra Part III.
43 Deborah A. Geier, Murphy and the Evolution of 'Basis, 113 TAx NOTES 576, 578
(2006).
44 I.R.C. § 61(a) (3) (2006).
45 See Geier, supra note 43.
46 I.R.C. § 1012. Basis only arises if the dollars used to purchase the item have already
been subject to tax and the taxpayer does not get a deduction for the cost incurred. This is
generally referred to as the cost being "capitalized." If some or all of the cost is currently
deducted, as opposed to capitalized, the basis is reduced accordingly. See, e.g., id. § 179
(permitting a deduction for costs that must normally be capitalized, but also requiring that
the basis be adjusted downward accordingly). Receiving a current deduction for the
purchase of an item is tantamount to purchasing the item with pre-tax dollars, as it reduces
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in the car. Basis may be recovered in a number of different ways, but
the most common is by subtracting it from the amount realized upon
the sale of the item.47 For instance, when the taxpayer sells the car
above, say for $15,000, he subtracts the basis from the amount realized
on the sale to calculate the taxable gain, which in this case is $5,000
($15,000 amount realized minus $10,000 basis). By virtue of the basis
rules, the taxpayer has received back, tax free, his initial $10,000, on
which he has already paid tax, and is only taxed on the previously
untaxed $5,000 increase in value. The basis rules become significantly
more complicated for tax-free exchanges, where the need arises to
track basis in the exchanged items to ensure that the untaxed gains or
losses will be appropriately treated when the exchanged items are ulti-
mately disposed of in a taxable exchange.
Where property is subject to wear and tear and used either in a
business or profit-seeking activity, the Code permits a taxpayer to re-
cover basis over the "useful" life of the property by taking depreciation
deductions. 48 These deductions, calculated as a percentage of basis,
reduce a taxpayer's current taxable income, effectively allowing tax-
payers to receive money tax free. These amounts are seen as a return
of the taxpayer's after-tax investment in the depreciable property, and
accordingly basis is reduced by the amount of depreciation allowed. 49
When the property is ultimately disposed of, the reduction in basis will
lead to either an increased gain or decreased loss, reflecting the fact
that the taxpayer already received at least part of his initial investment
back tax free in the form of depreciation deductions.
Other provisions, although they do not technically fall under the
heading of basis or basis recovery, mimic the function of the basis
rules, i.e., they are designed to ensure that taxpayers receive their ini-
tial after-tax investments back tax free, while subjecting any taxpayer
current taxable income by the amount of the purchase price, allowing taxpayers to receive
that money tax free.
Basis may be adjusted upward for, among other things, improvements that are alloca-
ble to capital account, i.e., improvements that must be capitalized and may not be cur-
rently deducted. Basis may be adjusted downward for certain deductions, such as
depreciation or losses, that are treated as a recovery of basis while the taxpayer retains the
item, as opposed to at disposition. See id. § 165 (allowing loss deductions); id. § 167 (al-
lowing depreciation deductions); id. § 263 (requiring capitalization of certain expendi-
tures); id. § 1016 (permitting adjustments to basis).
Other methods exist for creating or obtaining basis. For instance, someone who has
been injured and receives property as damages receives such property tax free under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). To ensure that the taxes on the damages are excused entirely and not merely
deferred, such a person will be given a basis in the property of its fair market value, such
that an immediate sale will not generate any tax. In this case, basis is used as a tool to
prevent a single, as opposed to double, tax.
47 See id. § 1001(a).
48 See id. §§ 167-68.
49 See id. § 1016(a)(2) (requiring basis adjustment for depreciation allowed under
I.R.C. §§ 167, 168).
2010] 293
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
gains to tax. Thus, the annuity rules are designed to allow taxpayers
to exclude from income amounts in periodic payments that corre-
spond to their initial after-tax investment in the annuity, while requir-
ing inclusion of amounts that represent the untaxed return on that
investment.5 0
2. Creating Basis in Virtual Worlds
When considering basis issues in the context of virtual worlds, the
first question is how basis gets created in virtual items. To keep mat-
ters simple, at least initially, I will assume the status quo, i.e., that vir-
tual income earned in-world and left in-world is not subject to real-
world taxes. Instead, taxes are due if, and only if, a virtual-world par-
ticipant cashes out, i.e., converts her virtual wealth to real-world
wealth by using an approved exchange, such as the LindeX, or by sell-
ing the item for cash. 51
In a "cash-out" regime, basis can be created in only two ways. The
first is through any monthly subscription fees a taxpayer pays to gain
access to the virtual world. The second is by engaging in a taxable
exchange, such as using real-world, after-tax dollars to purchase vir-
tual goods or exchanging real-world property or services for virtual
goods. I address each way of creating basis in turn.
Lederman addressed the question of whether subscription fees
should create basis in virtual goods in her article "Stranger than Fic-
tion"." Taxing Virtual Worlds.52 She concluded that monthly fees
purchase the right to play, as opposed to goods, and that such fees are
not typically the type of expenditure that must be capitalized, thereby
giving rise to basis. 53 The monthly fees are expenditures that relate to
a period smaller than a typical tax accounting year, thus warranting a
current deduction. In addition, similar fees for licenses are not typi-
cally allocated to property obtained pursuant to the license. Leder-
man's analysis is done in the context of drops;54 however, the
reasoning applies to all virtual goods regardless of how they are ac-
50 Id. § 72.
51 For purposes of this analysis, it does not matter whether the sale is permitted or
forbidden by the virtual-world developers.
52 Lederman, supra note 1, at 1648-50.
53 Id.
54 Drops are objects that other characters possess but drop upon defeat. Players may
pick up the dropped items and use them or, in most cases, trade them to other players. See
id. at 1643 & n.113.
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quired. 55 I concur with her assessment that user fees do not create
basis in virtual goods.
5 6
This analysis leaves the acquisition of virtual goods in a taxable
exchange as the primary manner in which people might obtain basis
in their virtual goods. For instance, assume that Grant converts $100
into 1000 gold pieces through an exchange or purchases a sword on
Itembay for $100. He should have a $100 basis in those goods under
I.R.C. § 1012. 5 7 However, the analysis is a little more complicated
than it initially appears. In many game worlds, participants are given
only use rights in the goods that they acquire. Thus, even though we
may use the term virtual property where use rights are acquired, ar-
guably use rights are services-not property-and capitalization and
basis are thus inappropriate. If the expenditures are personal in na-
ture, no deduction is permitted.58 In addition, as Lederman has ar-
gued, the exchange of services may not be a realization event giving
rise to the need to calculate gain or loss.59
Despite these concerns, I believe that even where only use rights
are acquired, it is appropriate to allow basis. As Camp argued in The
Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, property is generally
seen as a bundle of rights, and use rights therefore constitute a form
of property.60 I concur. However, even if use rights are not consid-
ered property, basic tax theory suggests that taxpayers be allowed basis
in their virtual goods. Consider Grant, above, who purchased 1000
gold pieces for $100. If the next day he sells the 1000 gold pieces for
$100, he has no accession to wealth. However, if we deny him basis in
55 That said, if someone were to receive virtual property for paying the subscription
fee, say a set number of gold pieces, a good argument would exist for allocating some
portion of the fee as basis in such property. For instance, Linden Labs offers a premium
account in Second Life in which a participant receives a set number of Lindens per month
as part of the plan. Taxpayers arguably should have some basis in those Lindens, although
it may be difficult to determine how much of the subscription fees should be allocated to
the property.
56 Indeed, I rely on such reasoning to argue that virtual income cannot be considered
part and parcel of what one purchases with one's monthly subscription fees. As a result,
taxing the value of virtual income left in-world does not amount to a double tax on con-
sumption, as Lederman argues is the case for game worlds. See Lederman, supra note 1, at
1659. Rather, it is an accession to wealth above and beyond what one has purchased. See
Chodorow, supra note 3, at 716-20.
57 See Lederman, supra note 3, at 137. Other means of generating basis include being
paid in Lindens for real-world work or exchanging real-world goods for virtual ones.
58 See I.R.C. § 262 (2006). But see id. § 183 (permitting deductions to the extent of
income from a non-profit seeking activity).
59 See Lederman, supra note 1, at 1654.
60 Camp, supra note 1, at 54-55. Camp's argument went to Lederman's contention
that the exchange of use rights would not lead to tax liability because, absent the existence
of property, there was no realization event under I.R.C. § 1001. See Lederman, supra note
1, at 1654. If use rights are a form of property for realization purposes as Camp contends,
they should also be property for basis purposes.
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the gold pieces, he would be taxed on $100-the amount he received
for cashing out-thus causing the tax result to deviate from economic
reality.61
To avoid this result, we could allow the taxpayer a deduction for
the initial expense, a difficult proposition if the expenditure is per-
sonal,62 treat the second sale as not a realization event (also contrary
to current law), or treat the use rights as property and allow the tax-
payer basis in her virtual gold. As I believe that use rights really are a
form of property and granting basis in this context would be no differ-
ent from granting basis in the right to future income, 63 I am partial to
this third approach.
If we relax the assumption that taxes on virtual income are due
only upon cash out, the basis issue gets significantly more complex, as
basis might be created in a number of different ways. As noted above,
several proposals exist for taxing purely in-world transactions. For in-
stance, Lederman proposes taxing sales for currency-but not ex-
changes-in Second Life, because sales purportedly represent the
fruits of profit-oriented activities. 64 Such transactions would create ba-
sis because the money invested in virtual goods or currency acquired
in this manner would have already been subjected to tax. I have pro-
posed that transactions in worlds that preclude cashing out would be
shielded from taxation, but that transactions in worlds that permit
cashing out would be subject to taxation. 65 However, to account for
administrative difficulties and other concerns, I propose a de minimis
threshold of $600 per world per year. Thus, identical transactions in
"open" worlds by different taxpayers would create basis in some cases,
but not in others.
Still others argue that all transactions in "commodified" worlds
such as Second Life should be taxable. 66 Taxation of all transactions
would simplify matters because every in-world transaction would cre-
ate basis in exactly the same way as would happen in the real world.
67
61 Although it is true that someone who pays $100 for a haircut and then charges
$100 to give someone else a haircut has not had a change in wealth, that person has con-
sumed the first haircut, thus leading to income. In contrast, Grant here is passing along
the same 1000 gold pieces and has not consumed them. Any benefit he receives from
owning them in the interim is imputed and therefore not subject to tax.
62 See I.R.C. § 262.
63 See, e.g., Estate of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding
that a taxpayer had basis in future rights to anticipated stock dividends he received in
exchange for cash).
64 Lederman, supra note 1, at 1666. Presumably, this rule could apply in other un-
scripted worlds, depending on how those worlds are structured.
65 See Chodorow, supra note 3, at 697-98.
66 See Seto, supra note 3.
67 For a discussion of the different types of virtual transactions and their appropriate
tax treatment, assuming that the normal tax laws would apply to such transactions, see
Chodorow, supra note 3, at 741-42.
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However, full taxation of virtual transactions highlights another prob-
lem that plagues all proposals and creates significant difficulties for
basis accounting in virtual worlds.
Although virtual currency looks and functions like currency with
a given world, for federal tax purposes, virtual currency is property.
Thus, in-world "sales" are treated like barter exchanges for tax pur-
poses. As a result, if sales are taxable, the basis in currency received is
the fair market value of that currency at the time of the transaction. 68
Thus, unlike dollars, which have a constant value for tax purposes and
therefore a basis equal to face value in virtually all cases, the basis in
each batch of virtual currency received in a taxable transaction de-
pends on the market value of such batch at the time of such transac-
tion.69 Therefore, if a taxpayer engages in a large number of taxable
in-world transactions, he will potentially have an otherwise fungible
currency consisting of batches with different bases and different hold-
ing periods. 70
3. Basis Recovery in Virtual Worlds
Having identified the various possible ways to create basis in vir-
tual goods, I turn next to consider the difficulties of tracing basis
through virtual spaces. As above, I begin the analysis on the assump-
tion that in-world transactions will not be taxed and that tax will be
due only when someone cashes out. People can cash out in two ways.
First, a player can sell her entire player account to someone else. This
method presents little difficulty for the seller, as it is not necessary to
allocate basis among whatever virtual property is included in the ac-
count. Instead, one simply subtracts the aggregate basis from the
amount realized to ascertain gain. 71 Second, taxpayers can sell indi-
68 Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954)
(using fair market value of property received in a barter transaction to determine tax-
payer's basis in such property).
69 For information on the exchange rate and value of Lindens, the Second Life cur-
rency, see Second Life LindeX M Market Data, http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-
market.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
70 This can happen even absent in-world taxation. For example, if I purchase 1000
gold coins for $100 and a second batch of 1000 gold coins for $110, under the general
principles of I.R.C. § 1012, the two batches will have different bases.
As described more fully below in Part IV.B, one commentator has suggested account-
ing for these difficulties by treating virtual currencies as foreign currencies and subjecting
them to the foreign currency rules of I.R.C. § 987. See Chung, supra note 3, at 769-77.
71 Presumably, if an account contained capital and ordinary assets, the sale of an ac-
count would look somewhat like the sale of a business with its component assets. Accord-
ingly, it would be necessary to allocate basis and amount realized to the various items,
much as is done under I.R.C. §§ 1060 and 338. Were this to occur, then many of the
problems described below would apply also when entire accounts were sold. Also, the




vidual items, at which point it is necessary to determine gain or loss
for specific virtual items. I focus here on the latter situation.
The need for basis-tracing rules can best be seen by starting with
a simple example and slowly adding complications. For simplicity's
sake, I base all my examples on game worlds where the arguments for
nontaxation of in-world transactions seem strongest. However, the
analysis would work equally well with unscripted worlds. Let's return
to the example above of Grant, who purchases 1000 gold pieces for
$100 and then sells those gold pieces the next day for $100. As there
has been no accession to wealth, there should be no tax due. We
accomplish this goal by giving Grant a $100 basis in the gold pieces,
such that his taxable gain is $0 ($100 amount realized minus $100
basis). The same holds true if Grant purchases and then resells a vir-
tual sword for $100.
Next, assume that Grant purchases a sword for $100, which over
time appreciates to $150.72 He then trades the sword to Amy for a
shield she acquired by killing a dragon or performing some other feat
in-world. Grant has a $100 basis in his sword, while Amy has no basis
in her shield. In the real world, this barter transaction would be con-
sidered a realization event. Grant would owe tax on the $50 gain real-
ized, while Amy would owe tax on a $150 gain. Their basis in their
respective newly acquired items would be $150. However, under the
cash-out rule that we assume is in effect, the exchange would not be
taxed.
To preserve Grant's $50 gain, Grant should take the shield with a
basis of $100, and Amy should have no basis in the sword she acquires.
Then, if Grant cashes out and sells his new shield for $150, he will owe
tax on $50 of gain, not the full $150 he receives. In other words, in
light of the nontaxation of the barter exchange in-world, the basis
Grant has in the sword should transfer to the shield to ensure a real-
world tax result consistent with his economic gain.
In most regards, the cash-out rule means that in-world transac-
tions function as if they were like-kind exchanges governed by I.R.C.
72 In fact, the value of virtual items in game worlds may decline over time. In En-
tropia, virtual items degrade over time, thus becoming less valuable. See Brian Ekberg, GC
'07: Entrapia Universe, GAMESPOT, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.gamespot.com/pc/rpg/pro-
jectentropia/news.html?sid=6177556&mode=previews. This feature is similar to real-world
wear and tear and suggests that depreciation might be an appropriate basis-recovery model
if the player is engaged in a business or profit-seeking activity. As described below, ac-
counting for basis in the absence of depreciation will be difficult enough. Thus, I do not
advocate applying the depreciation rules to virtual goods even if they do deteriorate over
time.
In other worlds, items often lose value as the number of items available in a world
increases. In addition, some virtual items bind to avatars and may not be separately sold,
thus losing some of their exchange value. Because this example is meant to illustrate tax
principles, it may not precisely match the reality of any particular world.
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§ 1031 (a).73 Just as nontaxation in this context requires special basis
rules to ensure that tax gain matches economic gain upon the disposi-
tion of items acquired in this fashion, similarly, the nontaxation of in-
world transactions will require basis rules to ensure taxpayers are ap-
propriately taxed should they cash out their virtual loot.
So far, the basis issues seem fairly straightforward and require the
simple application in the virtual context of the substituted basis rules
found in nonrecognition provisions such as I.R.C. § 1031 (d). Where
gain or loss is not recognized, a taxpayer's basis in the item given up
transfers to the item received. The first difficulty arises when a tax-
payer exchanges one or more items for many, as the basis in the origi-
nal item or items must be allocated among the many items received.
The second difficulty arises when a taxpayer commingles fungible
items with different bases and then acquires some item using this
common pool. In virtual realms, this commingling is most likely to
occur with virtual currency.
For example, assume that Grant purchases a sword for $100 and
then sells it in-world for 1000 gold pieces. As the sale is a tax-free
exchange because Grant has not cashed out, the logic of I.R.C. § 1031
suggests that he should have a basis of $100 in the gold pieces, allo-
cated evenly among the pieces (i.e., $0.10 per gold piece). If he then
takes 600 of these gold pieces and purchases a potion, logic suggests
that he should have a $60 basis in the potion and a $40 basis in the
remaining 400 gold pieces. So far, so good.
Now, imagine that Grant purchases 1000 gold pieces for $100 and
earns another 1000 gold pieces in-world for guiding other players on a
quest. Under a cash-out regime, he is not taxed on earning the sec-
ond 1000 gold pieces and therefore receives no basis in them. He
now has 2000 gold pieces, 1000 of which have a $0.10 basis and 1000
of which have no basis. For purposes of this analysis, we assume that
he keeps all of his gold coins in the same online account. What hap-
pens if Grant now buys a cloak for 800 gold pieces and then sells the
cloak for $80? How much gain should Grant report? If each gold
piece has its own basis that gets transferred to the cloak, the answer
depends on which gold pieces he used. Clearly, some rule for tracing
or allocating basis must be developed.
While this simple example helps illuminate the problem, it is im-
portant to note how simple it really is. First, the example assumes
only two batches of gold pieces, one with no basis and the other with a
$0.10 per coin basis. It is not hard to imagine a player with several
73 I.R.C. § 1031 might apply in some cases, but it is expressly limited to items held for
trade or business or the production of income and applies only to "like-kind" property.




batches of gold pieces, each with a different basis. Second, the exam-
ple assumes only three transactions. Active players may well buy, sell,
and trade multiple times before eventually selling one of their virtual
items for real-world cash. Basis would need to be traced through each
of these transactions. Finally, the assumption that all in-world transac-
tions are free from taxation may not hold. If some in-world transac-
tions become taxable, the ways in which basis can be created will
multiply, as will the occasions on which taxpayers will need to know
the basis of their virtual goods to determine their tax liability.
III
EXISTING MODELS FOR BASIS RECOVERY
To date, the Code and regulations have employed two different
regimes for basis recovery on the sale of property.74 The first, which I
will call the tracing approach, is property specific. Basis inheres in
specific items of property, and gain or loss is determined for each
item of property standing alone. Examples of this approach include
the rules associated with stock sales and inventory items, 75 as well as
the basis rules that apply to tax-free corporate reorganizations, 76
which permit taxpayers to designate which items are exchanged for
which other items, thereby transferring basis directly from one asset to
the next. Under the tracing approach, tax results may vary from over-
all economic results when investments are viewed as a whole. Taxpay-
ers can sell loss property and hold gain property resulting in a tax loss,
when, from an economic perspective, they may still have made money.
The second approach, which I will call the pooling approach,
considers property in the aggregate and therefore pools basis, as-
signing it back out to specific pieces of property based on the pooled
assets' relative fair market value. Examples of this approach include
the partnership basis rules, 77 the averaging option available for deter-
mining gain or loss from the sale of mutual fund shares, 78 and the
basis rules applicable in transactions that comply with I.R.C. § 351
(governing certain exchanges of property for stock in a corpora-
74 The tax laws contain a number of other provisions that affect basis recovery that do
not implicate the sale of property. For instance, the income inclusion rules found in § 72
(annuities) address how to recover basis as the taxpayer receives payments over time. Simi-
larly, the depreciation and various amortization rules address how to recover basis while
the taxpayer retains property. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167; id. § 195(b). The rules in I.R.C. § 453
regarding installment sales involve the sale of property. Id. § 453. However, they affect the
timing of gain or loss recognition, whereas the two approaches described in the text above
also determine the amount of gain or loss.
75 See, e.g., id. § 471(a) (inventory); Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(1) (1960) (stock sales).
76 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 358.
77 See Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984-1 C.B. 159.
78 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(e).
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tion). 79 Under the pooling approach, the tax gain or loss on the sale
of a specific piece of property is the average economic gain or loss
associated with the class of assets whose basis is pooled.
This Part considers the different models found in the Code and
regulations with an eye toward identifying which might best apply in
the virtual context. If we assume that in-world transactions are not
subject to tax, it might be tempting to look solely at how the law treats
basis in tax-free exchanges. However, the rules governing taxable ex-
changes present many of the same issues. As it is easier to approach
these questions first in a taxable setting, I begin with the treatment of
basis in taxable exchanges and move on to the treatment of basis in
tax-free exchanges.
A. Taxable Exchanges
The existence of two approaches to basis recovery begs the ques-
tion: "Why?" One possibility is that, on a theoretical level, differences
in the nature of property warrant different tax treatments. Another
possibility is that historical contingencies or administrative concerns
have shaped the law's development. The truth lies somewhere in be-
tween. It turns out that our intuition regarding the proper basis rules
changes depending on whether the goods in question are fungible.
The principles that make sense for nonfungible assets-accounting
for each asset separately and giving taxpayers the right to decide
which assets to sell or hold-lose their salience when applied to fungi-
ble assets. Nonetheless, the law does not consistently apply basis rules
to assets based on their nature. Instead, as shown below, historical
circumstance and administrative concerns have created an incoherent
patchwork of laws.
1. Taxable Exchanges of Nonfungible Assets
The default rule in taxation is that each piece of property is
treated separately, and taxpayers have full discretion to determine
which property to sell, and when.80 For most taxable transactions, an
item's basis is its cost.8 1 As such, basis reflects a taxpayer's after-tax
investment in the property. Normally, the basis in the acquired asset
is allocated evenly across the entire asset such that if a taxpayer were
to sell half the asset (such as one-half of a one-acre plot of land), he
79 I.R.C. § 351; see Rev. Rul. 85-164, 1985-2 C.B. 117.
80 See MIC-AELJ. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 154 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining that the "ability to accelerate or postpone
gains and losses" is "one of the most fundamental aspects of the federal income tax").
81 See I.R.C. §§ 1011-12. Adjustments are allowed under I.R.C. § 1016. Special basis
rules exist for gifts (I.R.C. § 1015) and inheritances (I.R.C. § 1014). A discussion of these
special rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
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would subtract half of the basis from his amount realized.8 2 However,
if an asset consists of different components with different values, the
basis is allocated based on the relative fair market value of those com-
ponents.8 3 If the asset is capital or subject to I.R.C. § 1231, the tax-
payer's holding period for the asset begins the day after purchase.8 4
Finally, taxpayers have the discretion to sell their property or hold it,
thus giving them control over when to realize gains and losses.8 5 As a
result, taxpayers' tax gains or losses may not correspond to their ag-
gregate economic gains or losses.
These rules and the issues they raise are best discussed in the
context of a concrete example. Imagine a taxpayer who has two in-
vestments. The first is one share of Google, which he purchased for
$100 and which is now worth $400. The second is one share of GM,
which he purchased for $210 but which is now worth only $10. From
an aggregate economic perspective, the taxpayer has a $100 gain that
has yet to be taxed (a $300 gain in the Google stock and a $200 loss on
the GM stock). These investments are reflected in the following
chart:
Stock Basis FMV Gain/(Loss)
Google $100 $400 $300
GM $210 $10 ($200)
Totals $310 $410 $100
The taxpayer has discretion over which of the two shares to sell
and when. The separate treatment of the property in question com-
bined with the discretion regarding which stock to sell raises two is-
sues. First, if he chooses to sell the GM share, he can realize and
recognize a $200 loss even though in the aggregate he is $100 better
off than he was before he purchased the two shares. As a result, the
tax result will deviate significantly from the taxpayer's overall eco-
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a), ex. 1 (1960). But seeTreas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (as amended in
1972) (applying different rules in the part-sale/part-gift context).
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a), ex. 2. For instance, of the one-acre plot consisting of two
parts, one worth $100,000 because of its view or for some other reason, and a second worth
only $50,000, if the taxpayer sold the $50,000 portion, he would allocate to it only 1/3 of
his basis in the plot.
84 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-7, 1966-1 C.B. 188; Rev. Rul. 66-97, 1966-1 C.B. 190. Holding
periods are relevant for capital assets, because they determine whether the gain or loss on
sale will be treated as short- or long-term. Because gains can be recharacterized from ordi-
nary to capital under I.R.C. § 1231, holding periods are relevant for assets covered by that
section. See I.R.C. § 1231.
85 See GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 80.
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nomic reality.8 6 Second, keeping the gain and loss for the two shares
separate creates inefficiency, as the taxpayer might decide not to sell
the Google share to avoid paying tax on the gain even though he
would like to do so for non-tax reasons.8 7
One could address these issues in a number of ways. First, one
could eliminate the realization requirement.88 However, this option
creates liquidity problems for taxpayers and is only workable for assets
where a functioning market permits easy valuation.8 9 Second, one
could try to mandate which of the two assets the taxpayer should sell.
For instance, we could require taxpayers seeking to sell stock to sell
the stock with inherent gains before the stock with inherent losses.90
However, this approach seems in conflict with basic notions of liberty.
Taxpayers should be allowed to decide what property to own and what
to sell. Moreover, it will not fix the problem, at least in this example,
as selling the Google stock will not cause the tax gain ($300) to equal
the economic gain ($100).
Alternatively, one could address the problem from the other di-
rection by allocating some of the basis from the Google share to the
GM share to produce a gain proportional to the value of the asset
sold.91 This approach would require altering the rule described above
that the basis of an asset is its cost. The approach also requires deter-
mining which assets should be considered together for basis-realloca-
tion purposes. One could argue that shares in different companies
represent the broader category of investments, such that pooling is
appropriate. However, housing could also be seen as an investment.
Should part of the basis of one's home be allocated to one's stock?
Defining the appropriate pool for nonfungible assets would be tricky.
In addition, one would need to know the relative fair market
value of assets in a pool to allocate basis back out to the assets appro-
priately. This allocation is easy for fungible assets because they would
presumably all have the same market value, and it's cumbersome, but
doable, for items such as stock, which are traded on public markets.
86 This deviation will ultimately be reconciled when the taxpayer sells his share of
Google, but because of the time value of money, the acceleration of the deduction along
with the deferral of income recognition will provide a significant benefit to the taxpayer.
87 See Alan L. Feld, When Fungible Portfolio Assets Meet: A Problem of Tax Recognition, 44
TAX LAW. 409, 413 (1991) (discussing the lock-in effect and tax incentive to realize losses).
88 For a discussion of the realization requirement, see generally Deborah H. Schenk,
A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REv. 355 (2004).
89 See id. at 360-65.
90 As described infra note 126, Calvin Johnson has made such a suggestion for fungi-
ble goods.
91 In this hypothetical, the total value of the two shares is $410. The total basis is
$310. If one were to allocate 2.4% of the basis ($7.44) to the GM stock and 97.6% of the
basis ($302.56) to the Google stock, the sales would produce $2.56 and $97.44 of gain,
respectively, for a total of $100. The gain for each share would be in proportion to its
relative value, thus equating tax gain to economic gain.
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This allocation would be almost impossible with nonfungible assets for
which public markets and therefore reliable pricing information do
not exist. In sum, the rules governing basis and sales of nonfungible
assets in taxable transactions seem appropriate and are unlikely to
change.
2. Taxable Exchanges of Fungible Assets
The propriety of the regime described above is questionable for
fungible assets because the justification for allowing tax results to devi-
ate from economic results is weak. An investment in fungible assets
can readily be seen as an aggregate investment. If a taxpayer invested
$20,000 in a company and her interest, however denominated, now
has a fair market value of $30,000, she has a gain of $10,000. If she
sells half of her interest, she has cashed out of half of her investment,
and it seems appropriate, at least from an economic perspective, that
she be taxed on half of the gain. It seems irrelevant that the taxpayer
might have purchased different lots of stock or partnership interests
at different times and for different amounts. Moreover, although it
seems wrong to tell a taxpayer which assets he must sell when he owns
a car, a house, and one share of stock, it should not matter to the
taxpayer which assets he sells if the assets in question are identical.
One's ownership interest in a company remains the same regardless
of whether one sells ten shares marked 1-10 or 90-100. Thus, liberty
interests do not come into play.
As described above, matching the economic and tax gains could
be accomplished either by controlling which property a taxpayer is
deemed to have sold or by pooling basis. Yet, despite the theoretical
justifications for doing so when assets are fungible, the law governing
basis recovery for fungible assets differs depending on the type of as-
set involved. Indeed, there are different rules governing stock in com-
panies, inventories, partnership interests, and mutual fund shares.
Each method and the issues they raise are discussed below.
Although one share of stock is indistinguishable from another of
the same class in terms of the ownership interest it represents in a
company or the rights it gives its owner, shares have historically been
represented by physical certificates, each bearing a unique identifier,
and therefore distinguishable from one another. Pre-income tax
authorities recognized the fungibility of ownership interests despite
the ability to distinguish stock certificates; 92 however, the first court to
address the question of basis in shares for tax purposes held that each
share is to be treated as separate property and given its own, separate
92 Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1908) (allowing brokers to return to
customers certificates different than those deposited).
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cost basis. 93 Moreover, the regulations have consistently permitted
taxpayers to designate which items they seek to sell.9 4
As a result, as with nonfungible assets, taxpayers can control the
amount of gain or loss they realize and thus must recognize. The sep-
arate nature of each share means that gains or losses on stock must be
determined for each share separately even where all the stock is sold
at once. Thus, if some shares give rise to gains on the sale, and others
give rise to losses that are disallowed for tax purposes-for instance,
because the stock is sold to a related party95-taxpayers are not per-
mitted to net gains and losses before applying the loss-limitation
provision .96
Absent identification of the specific shares being sold, the regula-
tions require that taxpayers use the formulaic First In/First Out
(FIFO) method of accounting, where the shares sold will be deemed
to be the first acquired. Such a default rule is necessary because a
taxpayer may fail to designate which shares she is selling, or she may
not have any intent, at the time of sale, regarding the shares sold.97
The use of an ordering rule reduces the ability to manipulate gains
and losses. Nonetheless, in most cases it will lead to divergent tax and
economic results.
Similar rules apply to inventory items, although taxpayers have
greater discretion with regard to the ordering rule. When a taxpayer
purchases and sells inventory, some system must exist to match the
inventory cost (basis) against the income generated from sales to de-
termine taxable income. The question is, how? The method of inven-
tory accounting for tax purposes must conform as closely as possible
to the best accounting practices used for the taxpayer's trade or busi-
93 See Skinner v. Eaton, 45 F.2d 568, 570 (2d Cir. 1930) ("The Revenue Act does not
permit merging the cost of stock acquired at various prices and over a period of years.
Shares of stock are identifiable, and, for income tax purposes, they are regarded as specific
properties.").
94 See T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 135 (1918). These rules are now found in
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (c) (1960). The regulations provide rules to allow taxpayers to make
the appropriate designations. If a taxpayer has physical certificates, the ones she delivers
to the buyer or to her broker for sale are the ones deemed sold. If the shares are held in
street name, i.e., by the broker on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer must identify the
shares she seeks to sell at the time of the sale, and the broker must confirm the identifica-
tion in writing within a reasonable period. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(3).
95 See I.R.C. § 267 (2006).
96 See Lakeside Irr. Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1942) ("[W]here, as
here, four unrelated lots of stock were separately acquired and might readily have been
separately sold, the fact that after ascertaining the value of each lot all were transferred
together for a lump price will not require or authorize a merger of costs.").
97 Although it would certainly be possible to allow a taxpayer to make such a designa-
tion after the fact, such a rule seems at odds with the notion that shares are separate items
of property. If someone has actually sold shares A, B, and C, represented by specific, iden-
tifiable certificates, it seems bizarre to allow that taxpayer to determine after the fact that
he has actually sold shares D, E, and F, represented by other certificates.
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ness. 98 Moreover, that method must clearly reflect income.9 9 This
gives taxpayers some discretion regarding how to match their inven-
tory revenues to basis. 100 If the specific inventory items sold cannot be
identified, the default is FIFO. 1°1 However, I.R.C. § 472 allows taxpay-
ers to use Last In/First Out (LIFO) under certain circumstances. 102
In addition, the regulations permit taxpayers to elect other methods,
including averaging, so long as they accord with best practices for the
taxpayer's industry and accurately reflect income. 103 As a practical
matter, the IRS generally opposes averaging, 10 4 and identifying spe-
cific lots is often quite difficult. As a result, inventory accounting for
tax purposes most often involves a forced-ordering rule borrowed
from a company's financial accounting system.
In contrast to the stock and inventory rules, the rules governing
partnership interests take a pooling approach that is more consistent
with the unified investment theory described above. Taxpayers must
pool the basis of all their partnership interests and allocate it back to
those interests based on relative fair market value. Thus, imagine a
partnership where interests are segregated into 1% tranches. Next
assume that a taxpayer purchases two interests, one for $100 and the
other for $200. His total aggregate interest in the partnership is 2%
and his aggregate basis is $300. However, unlike in the case of stock,
where each interest retains its own separate basis, the aggregate basis
is allocated evenly between the two interests, with each having a $150
basis.10 5 Thus, when the taxpayer sells one of the two interests, he
98 I.R.C. § 471(a).
99 Id.
100 To confuse matters, the regulations eschew the traditional language about basis
and basis recovery. Instead, income is determined by determining the revenues generated
from the sale of inventory and subtracting from them the "value" of the inventory sold.
Value is most often determined as either cost, or the lower of cost or market. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.471-2(c) (as amended in 1973). However, the rules provide some flexibility, as best
accounting practices differ from industry to industry. Moreover, rather than having the
taxpayer directly value the inventory sold, the regulations provide that one should value
the remaining inventory. See id. By valuing the inventory on hand at the end of a given
year, it is possible both to derive the value/basis of the inventory sold during the year and
to establish the value/basis of inventory on hand for the next year.
101 Id. § 1.471-2(d).
102 I.R.C. § 472(a) (allowing a taxpayer to use LIFO "in accordance with such regula-
tions as the Secretary may prescribe").
103 See id. § 471(a).
104 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-234, 1971-1 C.B. 148 (rejecting the application of average
value because, in a rising market where cost regularly increases, the method would consist-
ently understate income).
105 See Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984-1 C.B. 159 (indicating that the unified/aggregate basis
rules applicable to property under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) are applicable to interests in a
partnership). This Revenue Ruling actually addresses a situation where a partner has both
general-partnership and limited-partnership interests. On the theory that the greater in-
cludes the lesser, it seems clear that the holding encompasses situations where the same
type of interest (general or limited) is exchanged.
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recovers half of his basis, and his tax gain or loss equals half of the
overall gain or loss that he has incurred in his investment. 10 6
Strangely, this pooling applies not only to fungible interests but also
across different types of interests, such as general and limited partner-
ship interests, which afford different rights and responsibilities and
are therefore not fungible. 10 7 I have been unable to locate any ratio-
nale for this rule.
The rules governing mutual funds provide another example of
basis pooling. Taxpayers who purchase and sell mutual fund shares
may use the traditional stock rules for determining their gains and
losses. 10 8 However, beginning in 1971, the Treasury Department
amended its regulations to permit taxpayers to adopt one of two basis-
pooling approaches for determining gain or loss on the sale of mu-
tual-fund shares. 10 9
Under the single-category method, taxpayers may aggregate the
basis in all their shares and then allocate an average amount to each
share. 110 This basis is then used to determine gain or loss on sale and
is subtracted from the remaining basis for purposes of determining
the gain or loss on future sales. As a result, the tax gain and economic
gain on the sale of shares match. Finally, as with partnership interests,
the basis is seen as a unified whole, with the gain or loss determined
on a per-share basis. The regulations provide that taxpayers will be
deemed to sell the longest-held shares first, such that any gain or loss
will be long-term to the extent sufficient shares held long-term are in
the account."' 1 If those shares are exhausted, shares held short-term
will be deemed sold, and gain or loss associated with those shares will
be deemed short-term. 112
Under the double-category averaging method, taxpayers may cre-
ate two pools of shares, one for shares held for under one year and
one for shares held for more than one year.' 13 Taxpayers are to deter-
mine the average basis per share for each pool and attribute to each
106 In contrast, when a partner receives a distribution from a partnership, that distribu-
tion reduces his basis first and then, if all the basis has been recovered, leads to income.
See I.R.C. § 705(a).
107 See Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984 C.B. 159; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-3(f), ex. 6 (2000)
(explaining how to account for sales of units of interest in a partnership).
108 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(1) (1960).
109 See id. § 1.1012-1(e). A taxpayer who adopts a method for one account at a given
mutual-fund company must adopt that method for all accounts held at that company. Id.
§ 1.1012-1 (e) (2).
110 See id. § 1.1012-1(e)(4).
111 Id. § 1.1012-1 (e) (4) (ii). The regulations on this point are somewhat confusing be-
cause they were written at a moment of transition in the holding-period rules.
112 Taxpayers may not use this approach if it appears that the purpose for doing so is
to convert short-term gains and losses into long-term gains and losses. See id. § 1.1012-
1 (e) (4) (iii).
113 Id. § 1. 10 12-1 (e) (3).
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share that basis. A taxpayer can then specify from which pool to sell
shares. Thus, the taxpayer has the power to determine whether the
gain or loss she realizes will be afforded short- or long-term treatment.
Absent specification, it is presumed that the shares sold are from the
pool of shares held longer than one year, to the extent available, and
then from the pool of shares held for one year or less.1 14 Within each
category, it is assumed that the longest-held shares in the category are
sold first. 15 Once a taxpayer's shares are held for more than one
year, they are moved from one pool to the next.1 16
Finally, the rules specify that taxpayers may elect different meth-
ods for accounts held at different mutual-fund companies, but that
they must use the same method for accounts at a given company."17
This rule means that if two companies offer identical S&P 500 index
funds, a taxpayer could purchase shares at both companies, electing
to average basis in one and designate shares in the other. When the
taxpayer decides to purchase or sell shares, he could select which of
the funds, and the corresponding method, to use. In this way, he
could avoid pooling when disadvantageous and adopt it when
advantageous.
The pooling approach raises several issues not present in the trac-
ing approach used for nonfungible assets. The first difficulty is decid-
ing which items should be pooled. As noted above, pooling makes
sense for fungible assets because they can readily be understood to be
an aggregate investment, and allocating basis back to individual items
is relatively easy. If assets are not fungible, the argument for pooling
weakens. Nonetheless, Congress and the Treasury have declined to
extend pooling to fungible assets, such as stock, while extending it
beyond fungible assets, as is the case for partnership interests. 1 8
Assuming Congress were to embrace fungibility as the key factor
in determining whether to require basis pooling, some definition of
"fungible" must be developed. Companies would likely try to defeat
pooling by creating minute differences in different classes of stock.
Additionally, taxpayers could seek to avoid the rule by holding their
investments in different names. To prevent this, some form of attribu-
tion rule would need to be adopted. 119
The ability to hold the same security in different locations would
also create a problem with basis reporting.1 20 Institutions can only
114 Id. § 1.1012-1(e) (3)(ii).
115 Id. § 1.1012-1(e) (3) (iii) (b).
116 Id. § 1.1012-1 (e) (3) (iii) (a).
117 Id. § 1.1012-1 (e) (2).
118 See Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984-1 C.B. 159; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-3(f), ex. 6 (2000).
119 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006); id. § 318.
120 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 403, 122
Stat. 3765, 3854-55 (requiring basis reporting beginning in the 2011 tax year).
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report the basis of which they are aware. If pooling is required and
taxpayers can hold the same or similar assets in different places, re-
porting will be inaccurate, and compliance costs will rise tremen-
dously. Absent a rule requiring taxpayers to hold similar assets in one
account, it is not clear how a pooling regime would work given the
current reporting system.
The second issue is whether to pool or fragment basis. For in-
stance, when the basis from different partnership interests is pooled
and allocated back to the separate interests, the pooled fragments
could either retain their individual identity or be melded into a uni-
fied whole. To return to the partnership example above, we could
treat the basis of each 1% interest as a unified $150, where the gain or
loss on sale is calculated once with regard to each interest sold. In
contrast, if we treat the basis as fragmented, each 1% interest will have
a basis of $150, but half of the interest has a $50 basis, associated with
the first interest acquired, and the other half has a $100 basis, associ-
ated with the second interest acquired. Under this approach, when
the interest is sold, the amount realized must be fragmented and
matched to the basis fragments. Gain or loss on those fragments must
be separately calculated. As a result, some fragments may reflect
gains, while others reflect losses.
Under normal circumstances, the unified and fragmented ap-
proaches will yield the same amount of gain. For instance, if our tax-
payer were to sell an interest for $180, under a unified approach,
there would be a $30 gain. Under the fragmented approach, there
would be a $40 gain on the first fragment and a $10 loss on the second
for a net gain of $30. However, this is not always the result. For in-
stance, if the interest were sold to a related party, I.R.C. § 267 would
preclude the taxpayer from taking the loss determined using the frag-
mented approach, leaving him with a $40 tax gain, even though he
had only gained $30 from an economic perspective. 121 Similarly, if
the asset is capital and the loss exceeds the gain, I.R.C. § 1211 would
preclude the deduction of losses in excess of gains.122
In contrast, unifying basis may lead to recharacterization of gain
or loss as either long-term or short-term, when compared to the frag-
mented approach, because holding periods cannot be unified. 123 If
the first interest described above had a long-term holding period,
while the second had a short-term holding period, under the unified
approach, half of the $30 gain ($15) would be long-term and half
121 See Lakeside Irr. Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1942) (prohibiting a
taxpayer from treating different groupings of stock as a unified whole to net out gains and
losses).
122 See I.R.C. § 1211(b).
123 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-3(b).
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($15) would be short-term. Under the fragmented approach to basis,
the $40 gain would be long-term, while the $10 loss would be short-
term. Assuming the gain and loss could net out, the taxpayer would
be left with $30 of long-term gain. Despite these concerns, the regula-
tions appear to take a unified approach to basis and a fragmented
approach to holding periods. 124
What accounts for these different approaches to basis recovery?
The answer appears to be historical contingency and administrative
convenience rather than some grand or even consistent theoretical
approach. The rules for inventory accounting seem deeply rooted in
pre-income tax financial-accounting practices, thus explaining why
the law developed as it did. As stock and partnership interests both
reflect ownership interests, it is not clear why the basis rules for the
two developed differently. The reason may well lie in the fact that
stock has historically been represented by numbered certificates that
could readily be conceived of as individual pieces of property, while
partnership interests are typically only spelled out in contractual
agreements.
While it would be tempting to ascribe to Congress some intent
regarding the fungible nature of mutual-fund shares and the theoreti-
cally appropriate basis-recovery tool, instead these rules appear to re-
flect administrative concerns on the part of mutual-fund companies
who were expected to report basis information to fund owners. Given
the various distributions that might affect basis, it was believed that it
would be easier for mutual-fund companies to provide average infor-
mation. 125 In the late 1990s, the Clinton administration proposed re-
quiring all investors to use average basis to calculate gain and loss, not
just for mutual funds, but also for all stock, but that proposal was
never enacted. 126 Designing rules for virtual worlds may present an-
other opportunity to revisit the myriad basis rules.
124 See Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984-1 C.B. 159; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-3(0, ex. 6, in which
the answer clearly indicates that taxpayers have a unified/aggregated basis in their partner-
ship interests, even in the context of publicly traded partnerships where the interests look
strikingly similar to shares of stock in corporations.
125 For a description of how the mutual-fund rules developed, see Gordon E. Warnke,
Developments, Theories and Themes in Stock Basis, in 12 TAx STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUI-
SITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCrURINGS 1111, 1126--30 (2008).
126 SeeJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 10 4 TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET PROPOSAL, JCS-2-96, at 59 (J.
Comm. Print 1996). More recently, as part of the Shelf Project series of proposals to help
Congress when it needs to raise revenue, Calvin Johnson has proposed a rule that would
require taxpayers to sell shares with the lowest basis first, thus maximizing the tax gain on
the sale of shares. While this rule would overstate economic gain, given the deferral bene-
fit afforded by a realization requirement and the need to raise revenue, Johnson is not
concerned by any early overtaxation (from an economic perspective) that may result from
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B. Tax-Free Exchanges
Basis rules take on particular significance in the context of tax-
free exchanges because basis must be carried over from one asset or
set of assets to the next to preserve gain or loss in the assets ex-
changed. This context is of particular interest when considering what
rule to adopt for virtual worlds because the most significant problems
with basis arise when in-world transactions are not taxed. As with the
rules for taxable transactions, the law follows two distinct approaches.
One permits tracing, while the other requires pooling of basis.
The corporate tax rules permit nonrecognition for exchanges in
two circumstances. The first involves corporate formation, where
I.R.C. § 351 permits taxpayers to exchange property for stock without
incurring any tax liability, so long as the taxpayers contributing prop-
erty control the corporation at the transaction's conclusion.' 2 7 The
second circumstance involves reorganizations, as described in I.R.C.
§ 368.128 Tax-free exchanges of partnership interests are not allowed,
and therefore there is no corresponding body of law. The law does
permit tax-free formation of partnerships, and the basis laws for part-
nerships track those for corporate formations under I.R.C. § 351.
To preserve the gain or loss not recognized in a tax-free ex-
change, the basis of any assets given up should transfer to the assets
acquired. 129 When one asset is exchanged for another, as often oc-
curs in I.R.C. § 1031 transactions (like-kind exchanges), the issues and
rules are fairly straightforward. However, when parties exchange mul-
tiple pieces of property, as often occurs in corporate formations and
reorganizations, a decision must be made whether to allow designa-
tion or require pooling.
For instance, imagine that a taxpayer owns three pieces of prop-
erty or blocks of stock, each with a fair market value of $50,000 but
with respective bases of $10,000, $20,000, and $30,000, and exchanges
them for three different classes of stock in a new corporation, each
worth $50,000. A decision must be made as to whether the taxpayer
can designate that the property given up has been exchanged for spe-
cific classes of stock, thus allowing the basis to transfer from one to the
other. If so, the three new classes of stock will have bases of $10,000,
$20,000, and $30,000 respectively, and the taxpayer will be able to de-
the proposal. Calvin H. Johnson, End Identification of Stock Certificates, 119 TAx NOTES 1171,
1174-75 (2008).
127 Control is defined as 80% of the combined voting power of all classes of stock and
80% of all total number of shares in all classes of stock. I.R.C. § 368(c). This provision is
not limited to corporate formation; however, that is the setting where it is most often
encountered.
128 Id. § 368. Certain transactions satisfy the technical requirements of both I.R.C.
§ 351 and § 368.
129 Id. § 358.
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cide how much gain to realize by selecting the block of shares that she
sells. However, if the taxpayer must allocate the aggregate basis of the
property given up across the property received, using the relative fair
market value of the property received to do so, each class of stock
received will have a $20,000 basis. If pooling is required, the question
arises as to whether the pooled basis should be unified or fragmented.
Unfortunately, the statute is silent on these issues, and the law has
been left to develop in the courts and by administrative practice.
While it might make sense that the rules for incorporations and reor-
ganizations should be the same, in fact, they have diverged. For I.R.C.
§ 351 transactions, the current rule requires pooling. 130 It appears
that basis is unified, while the holding period is fragmented.' 31 As
with partnership interests, basis is averaged even though the assets ac-
quired are not fungible.
In contrast, the basis rules for corporate reorganizations permit
taxpayers to designate which property is exchanged for which, thus
giving them control over when to trigger tax gains or losses, leading to
results inconsistent with their economic gains or losses.' 32 In cases in
which a shareholder gives up more shares than he receives and the
shares given up have different bases and holding periods, the current
130 See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(b)(2) (as amended in 2006) (indicating that if a taxpayer
received several classes of stock in return for property, the basis from the property was to
be allocated according to the relative fair market value of the classes of stock received);
Rev. Rul. 85-164, 1985-2 C.B. 117 (rejecting a taxpayer's effort to trace basis in specific
items given up to specific blocks of stock received); T.D. 9244, 2006-1 C.B. 463 (reaffirming
the pooling approach for I.R.C. § 351 transactions but applying a tracing regime to trans-
actions that qualify under both I.R.C. § 351 and § 368).
131 Rev. Rul. 85-164.
132 Initially, it appeared that taxpayers would be required to average basis in corporate
reorganizations. See, e.g., Arrott v. Comm'r, 136 F.2d 449, 451 (3d Cir. 1943) (noting that
the average basis approach is so well established in the tax-free exchange context that it
would take the Supreme Court or an act of Congress to change the rule); Comm'r v. Bo-
lender, 82 F.2d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 1936) (applying an averaging rule); Helvering v. Stifel,
75 F.2d 583, 584 (4th Cir. 1935) (applying an averaging rule). But see Bloch v. Comm'r,
148 F.2d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 1945) (rejecting the reasoning set forth in Arrott and allowing
tracing). In 1955, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 55-355, in which it noted that pooling
was appropriate in the reorganization context absent identification. Rev. Rul. 55-355,
1955-1 C.B. 418. Later that year, the Treasury issued new regulations regarding reorganiza-
tions that were somewhat ambiguous. See T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61. Despite Revenue
Ruling 55-355, at least one commentator believes that the relevant evidence suggests that
the Treasury intended pooling of basis in most cases. See Waruke, supra note 125, at
1133-37 (providing a more complete description of these regulations and the arguments
as to why averaging was likely intended).
In 2006, the IRS issued new regulations governing reorganizations. See T.D. 9244,
2006-1 C.B. 463. These regulations implement a tracing regime for reorganizations. Cit-
ing Treasury Regulation § 1.1012-1 (c) as support for this approach, they permit taxpayers
to designate which shares are exchanged for which in a tax-free reorganization, thus al-
lowing the basis and holding periods to transfer to specific blocks of stock and securities.
See id. at 464. Taxpayers may also allocate boot to specific lots of shares, thus giving taxpay-
ers more control over gain recognition in reorganizations. See id. at 464-65.
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regulations adopt a fragmented approach for both basis and holding
period of the shares received, such that gain and loss must be sepa-
rately determinedfor each fragment on the sale of such shares.
133
On the last business day of'the Bush administration, the Treasury
Department issued new proposed regulations designed to harmonize
some of the basis rules applicable to corporate transactions.134 These
regulations embrace the tracing approach, at least in the corporate
context. Among other things, these regulations propose to extend
the tracing regime to I.R.C. § 351 transactions where no liabilities are
assumed.1 35 They stop there only because they have not figured out
how to harmonize a tracing regime with the debt-relief provisions of
I.R.C. § 357(c), which take an aggregate approach. These regulations
also extend the tracing regime to distributions exceeding earnings
and profits under I.R.C. § 301 and to failed redemptions under I.R.C.
§ 302.136 It is not clear what the status of this proposal will be under
the Obama administration.
IV
TRACING BASIs THROUGH VIRTUAL SPACES
Having explored the different approaches to allocating basis
found throughout the Code, we turn next to consider which model
best suits virtual worlds. Recall that we have assumed, at least initially,
a cash-out rule, where in-world transactions are tax free. We must
know an asset's basis when it is sold for real-world cash so that we can
determine the amount of gain or loss the taxpayer has realized. To do
that, we may need to track basis through a series of tax-free ex-
changes, some of which may involve fungible items with different ba-
ses that may have been commingled.
In the real world, the issues that affect the choice of approach to
basis recovery include baseline assumptions about how basis is cre-
ated, taxpayers' freedom to arrange their own affairs, the fungibility of
assets and nature of an investment, and administrative capacity.
These concerns apply equally in the virtual context. However, there
may be aspects of virtual worlds that differ from the real world that
133 See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a) (2) (vi) (as amended in 2006). In other contexts, the
law appears to take an aggregate approach. For instance, in the partnership context, distri-
butions reduce aggregate basis. See I.R.C. § 705(a). Similarly, under Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1367-1 (c) (3), when a distribution in the S-corporation context reduces the basis of a
given share to $0, further distributions reduce the basis in other shares owned by the same
distributee. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1 (c) (3) (as amended in 2000).
134 Allocation of Consideration and Allocation and Recovery of Basis in Transactions
Involving Corporate Stock of Securities, 74 Fed. Reg. 3509 (proposedJan. 21, 2009) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
135 See id. at 3513.
136 See id. at 3510.
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affect our thinking on these matters. For instance, by not taxing in-
world transactions, we have created an environment in which numer-
ous, small-value, tax-free exchanges may take place. In addition, many
virtual-world participants are simply playing, thus implicating the rules
limiting deductions for personal expenses and losses and affecting
how we view the administrative burdens any system would impose. At
the same time, virtual goods can be tracked relatively easily, perhaps
making otherwise unfeasible approaches to basis tracking possible.
This Part considers first how a tracing approach to virtual basis
might work and then considers how a pooling approach might work.
In the end, I propose that the IRS adopt a hybrid approach to basis
recovery, where some assets retain their basis, while others have their
basis pooled and averaged, which would best balance the theoretical
and administrative concerns that virtual worlds present.
A. The Tracing Approach
Under the tracing approach, each piece of virtual property or
currency would have its own basis and taxpayers would have the ability
to decide what to sell and when. This approach makes sense in the
simple case. For instance, if Grant purchases a sword for $100 and
then sells it for $100, he has a $100 basis in the sword and therefore
realizes no gain or loss. It does not matter that he also owns a shield
with a $40 basis and a $100 fair market value, such that the total eco-
nomic gain on his virtual items is $60, and selling the sword closes out
50% of his investment, arguably yielding 50% of the gain, or $30.
This approach also works well for simple tax-free exchanges. For
instance, if Grant were to trade his shield for a cloak and then sell the
cloak for $100, the shield's basis would transfer to the cloak, and
Grant would report a $60 gain. This approach also works for more
complicated exchanges, such as where Grant trades the shield for a
helmet and a dagger. The shield's basis could be allocated to the hel-
met and dagger based on their relative fair market values. Nonethe-
less, if Grant engages in a number of trades before cashing out,
keeping track of basis through those trades could be difficult, much as
keeping track of basis when stocks split or companies spin off other
companies can be. In particular, unlike complicated I.R.C. § 1031
transactions, which are business related, usually involve significant
value, and for which tax advice is almost always sought, those at play
are not likely to pay significant attention to basis when they trade vir-
tual goods, but they will need to have done so if they cash out any of
their goods.
Additional difficulties arise if Grant trades several items for sev-
eral others. Under a tracing regime, Grant is able to designate which
items are traded for which. One can readily imagine that Grant would
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use the power to designate to maximize his tax position. In particular,
Grant would seek to transfer low basis to items he intended to con-
sume in-world and high basis to items that he planned to sell, regard-
less of the relative fair market value of the items traded. 13 7 Although
we allow this power to designate in the corporate reorganization con-
text, it is not clear that consistency requires that we allow it in all con-
texts, particularly because reorganizations do not involve the personal-
consumption element that virtual worlds do.
The tracing regime really begins to show signs of strain if a tax-
payer owns virtual currency acquired through different means and
then either sells some portion of that currency or uses it to acquire
virtual goods, which she then sells. Each batch could have its own
basis and holding period, which should transfer to any asset pur-
chased. As described below, tracing in this context raises a host of
daunting administrative issues. In addition, currency is fungible, rais-
ing questions about the propriety of the tracing approach.
It helps to begin with an example that sets out the basic problem
and allows us to explore how different tracing regimes might work.
Assume Grant had an account with 3000 gold pieces. He purchased
the first 1000 for $100, such that each coin had a $0.10 basis. Shortly
thereafter, he earned 1000 gold coins in-world, which were not taxed
and therefore have no basis. Finally, he purchased another 1000
coins, this time paying $200, such that each of these coins has a $0.20
basis. Next, assume that he purchased a cloak for 1200 gold pieces
and ultimately sold it for $120. To determine his gain or loss, we
would need to know Grant's basis in the cloak.
Under a designation rule, similar to that allowed for stock sales
and corporate reorganizations, Grant could decide which coins he
used to purchase the cloak. He could have either a $100 tax loss, if he
chose the coins with the highest basis, or a $100 gain, if he chose the
coins with the lowest basis. He could, of course, pick some other mix-
ture. Although this choice gives Grant the ability to manipulate his
tax results, it seems a little less troublesome than allowing designation
in the stock-sale context because designation in the latter situation
occurs at the time of sale, when the taxpayer knows he is going to
engage in a taxable transaction. In contrast, as with corporate reorga-
137 Assume Grant had two assets: a cloak worth $20 with a $50 basis, and a dagger
worth $50 with no basis. If Grant were to trade them for a $20 potion and a $50 spear in a
tax-free exchange, the basis from the cloak and dagger would transfer to the potion and
spear. If Grant has unfettered discretion to designate which items are exchanged for
which, he could designate that he had traded the $20 cloak for the $50 spear and the $50
dagger for the $20 potion, giving the spear a $50 basis and the potion no basis. If Grant
consumes the potion, he can still recover all his basis by selling the spear. To prevent such
results, one could either adopt a rule that designations be economically reasonable, i.e.,
the exchanged items should have similar value, or adopt a forced-ordering rule.
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nizations, taxpayers may not have any idea at the time of acquisition
whether they are going to sell the item acquired.
To avoid the possibility of manipulation one could instead em-
ploy a forced-ordering rule. In any event, one must have a default-
ordering rule to account for those who have no intent regarding the
coins they spend. As with designation, the tax result will likely deviate
from the economic result, but the deviation is not of the taxpayer's
making. The most common ordering rules found in the code are
LIFO and FIFO. l3 8 However, other models, or perhaps even a hybrid
tracing system, would work.
One of the more intriguing examples is the tracing rule created
to track loan proceeds. Before 1986, all personal interest was deducti-
ble, and there was no need to determine how taxpayers used loan
proceeds.139 Once deductions for personal interest were disallowed
and special limits were placed on investment interest, qualified-resi-
dence interest, and student-loan interest, to name a few, it became
necessary to trace the use of loan proceeds to identify the nature of
interest charged on loans. If funds are spent directly, no problem
exists. However, if funds are commingled, determining the use of
loan proceeds becomes quite difficult and some system is necessary to
determine which funds were used to purchase which goods or
services.
In 1987, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Regulation
§ 1.163-8T, which set forth a complex set of rules designed to trace
loan proceeds. The regulation provides that interest expenses are al-
located in the same manner as the underlying debt and that the un-
derlying debt will be "allocated by tracing disbursements of the debt
proceeds to specific expenditures.' 1 40 Many of the rules contained in
this regulation would not be applicable to tracing basis in virtual
worlds.14 1 However, other rules could be quite useful, as they relate to
the disbursement of funds from a central account with commingled
funds.
The regulation contains a default-ordering rule, which provides
that debt proceeds deposited in an account are deemed spent before
138 See I.R.C. § 472 (2006) (permitting the LIFO method for inventory accounting);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (1960) (prescribing FIFO as the default rule for stock sales).
Under a LIFO rule, Grant would be deemed to use 1000 gold pieces with an aggregate
basis of $100 and 200 gold pieces with no basis. Thus, he would report a $20 tax gain.
Under a FIFO regime, Grant would use 100 gold pieces with an aggregate basis of $200
and 200 pieces with no basis. Thus, he would report an $80 loss.
139 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 80, at 350 (describing the evolution of the IRS's
treatment of personal interest).
140 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-ST(a)(3) (as amended in 1997).
141 See, e.g., id. § 1.163-8T(c) (3) (i) (regulating disbursements to third parties).
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any unborrowed funds in the account. 142 If the proceeds of more
than one debt are deposited in an account, the ordering rules provide
that the earlier-deposited funds are spent first.143 In essence, this is a
FIFO rule.
The regulation provides supplemental ordering rules that over-
ride the defaults under certain circumstances. 144 In particular, a tax-
payer may treat an expenditure that occurs within fifteen days after
she deposits debt proceeds in an account as made from such depos-
its. 145 For example, if a taxpayer borrows $15,000, deposits the pro-
ceeds in her account for ten days and then buys a car for $15,000, she
can deem the expenditure to have been made from the recently de-
posited loan proceeds even if she has proceeds from an earlier loan in
the account. 146
Translated into the context of virtual worlds, one could easily en-
vision a rule modeled on Treasury Regulation § 1.163-8T that permit-
ted taxpayers to designate that funds recently contributed to an
account had been used to acquire some asset, but that absent designa-
tion or after some set period after a deposit, say fifteen days, a default
rule such as FIFO applied. Thus, if Grant were to sell a sword with a
$100 basis for 1000 gold pieces and then ten days later purchase a
cloak for 700 gold pieces, he could designate that the cloak was pur-
chased with the recently deposited gold pieces, thereby giving it a $70
basis. Absent designation, the FIFO rule would govern. 147 The partic-
ulars of any hybrid rule are limited only by one's imagination.
Any tracing approach for virtual goods presents certain theoreti-
cal and administrative difficulties. First, as noted above, whether one
allows designation or requires forced ordering, tax gain and loss
would likely deviate from economic gain and loss. While we do not
consider this deviation problematic if goods are nonfungible, rules
142 This rule applies both to unborrowed funds in the account before the debt pro-
ceeds are deposited and any unborrowed funds deposited thereafter. Id. § 1.163-
8T(c) (4) (ii).
143 Id. § 1.163-8T(c) (4) (ii).
144 For checking or similar accounts, expenditures are deemed made when a check is
written, provided that it is delivered to the recipient within a reasonable time. This re-
quirement prevents allocations from depending on the length of time a recipient holds a
check. Taxpayers may treat checks written on the same day as being made in any order.
Id. § 1.163-8T(c) (4) (iii) (A).
145 Id. § 1.163-8T(c) (4) (iii) (B).
146 In addition, if a taxpayer receives loan proceeds in cash, any cash expenditures she
makes over the next fifteen days will be regarded as being from those proceeds, and the
taxpayer may relate the expenditure back to the date she received the cash. Id. § 1.163-
8T(c) (5) (i). If the taxpayer continues to hold cash, the loan will be deemed to be held for
personal purposes, and the interest will not be deductible. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006);
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(5)(ii).
147 Under the hypothetical facts described above, FIFO would also yield a $70 basis.
This result is a function of the assumptions, not the method used.
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that permit divergence in the context of fungible goods are suspect,
although sometimes allowed. 148 The question here is how one should
think about virtual goods. Virtual currency is fungible, while other
virtual goods are not. Thus, a pure tracing or pooling rule will likely
fit poorly when applied to both.
Second, regardless of whether one traces or pools basis, in a tax-
free environment where basis transfers from one set of assets to an-
other, one must decide whether basis should be unified or frag-
mented. In the example above, if Grant used 1000 coins with $0.20
basis and 200 coins with no basis to purchase the cloak, his basis in the
cloak would be $200. If the basis is unified, then one simply subtracts
the amount realized ($120) from the total basis for an $80 tax loss.
However, if we are transferring basis from one asset to the next, it
seems more appropriate to fragment basis. Following this approach,
under the facts assumed above, 10/12 of the cloak has a $200 basis
and 2/12 has a $0 basis. If Grant sells the cloak for $120, 10/12 of the
sales price ($100) should be allocated to the part with $200 basis, lead-
ing to a $100 loss, and 2/12 of the sales price ($20) should be allo-
cated to the portion with no basis, for a gain of $20. Normally, the
gain and loss will offset to yield the same $80 loss as with unified basis.
However, if Grant were to sell the cloak to a related party, I.R.C. § 267
would disallow the loss, and Grant would have to report a $20 gain
even though he actually lost money.149 Although the issue whether to
unify or fragment basis transcends the decision whether to trace or
average basis, the case for fragmentation seems stronger if we are trac-
ing basis directly from one asset to the next.
Third, allowing designation requires taxpayers to keep track of
their basis in different batches of currency. In the example above,
there are only three batches, and this task does not seem too onerous.
However, taxpayers could have many different batches. If the assump-
tion that in-world transactions should be tax free is relaxed and some
subset of in-world transactions were in fact taxed, basis would be cre-
148 See supra Part III.A.2.
149 The same would occur under I.R.C. § 165 if the loss were deemed not to arise in a
trade or business and not in a transaction entered into for profit. See I.R.C. § 165.
Even if one adopts a unified approach to basis, one must still address the complica-
tions that arise when a taxpayer uses assets with different holding periods to acquire an-
other asset in a tax-free exchange. Under I.R.C. § 1223, taxpayers are allowed to tack the
holding periods of the assets given up to the newly acquired asset. I.R.C. § 1223(1). If
holding periods differ, the holding period is necessarily fragmented, even if the basis is
unified. As a result, gain or loss can be recharacterized from short-term to long-term. In
the example above, if the holding period of 10/12 of the cloak were deemed long-term
and the holding period of 2/12 were deemed short-term, with a fragmented basis there
would be a $100 long-term loss and a $20 short-term gain. If the basis were unified, there
would be an $80 loss, of which 83% would be classified as long-term and 17% would be
classified as short-term.
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ated through significantly more means than simply purchasing virtual
items for cash, and tracking basis would become even more difficult.
Fourth, a designation approach requires people actually to desig-
nate which currency they are using to acquire their virtual assets.
While this is workable in the corporate context, it is far more difficult
in the virtual-world context. Corporate reorganizations are business
transactions done with the advice of lawyers and accountants, who are
aware of the rules and can help ensure they are observed. In contrast,
tax-free exchanges in the virtual context will often occur casually, by
people at play and not thinking about the tax consequences of their
actions. Although keeping records may not be burdensome in a fully
taxable business, it is not clear whether it is warranted where only
some people will ultimately cash out and trigger tax liability. Nor is it
clear that taxpayers would actually comply with the rules, creating the
noncompliance issues of which the National Taxpayer Advocate
warned. 150
The existence of a default-ordering rule would solve some of
these problems, but it still requires knowledge of the bases of the dif-
ferent batches of currency on hand and the order in which those
batches were acquired whenever any item is purchased, so that the
basis can be determined upon sale. If one adopts a fragmented ap-
proach to basis, the task of tracking basis and determining gain or loss
on the sale of an asset becomes even more difficult.
Despite these problems, the nature of virtual objects presents an
opportunity to effect a tracing regime that does not exist in the real
world. Virtual assets are constructed from code, and every transaction
is capable of being electronically tracked. These facts present two pos-
sibilities that might ameliorate the administrative difficulties associ-
ated with tracing basis.
First, Congress could require all virtual-world publishers to track
basis for their participants and to report it, say on a Form 1099-
V(irtual). Congress has recently passed legislation to require broker-
age houses to retain and report basis figures for customers who hold
stock or other securities with them.151 Starting in 2011, when custom-
ers sell shares, the brokerage house must report to the taxpayer and
the government the gain or loss realized. 152 Similar rules could be
adopted for publishers of virtual worlds. For instance, if one adopted
a FIFO rule for expenditures from a player's common funds, the pub-
lishers could track the different batches of currency in the account,
their bases and holding periods, and when they were deposited.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.





When Grant purchases a sword, the computer could simply apply the
ordering rules and determine the sword's basis. When he sells the
sword, the developer could issue a Form 1099-V listing Grant's basis.
Such a rule imposes significant burdens on developers, and they
will likely oppose any such proposal, as brokers did successfully until
last year. And, as with brokers, developers may not know the appro-
priate basis of a given asset or batch of currency. For instance, devel-
opers will not know whether items that are transferred between
parties in-world without compensation have been given as gifts or pur-
chased on sites such as IGE.com. 153 If Grant purchases a sword for
$100 and then gives it to Amy, under the gift basis rules, Amy should
get a transferred basis of $100.154 In contrast, if Grant gives Amy the
sword because she paid him $80 outside the confines of the virtual
world, she should have an $80 basis in the sword. If in-world transac-
tions were taxable, they would create basis, and the developers would
need to know the relative fair market values of the items sold or
exchanged.
To remedy this problem, one could ask participants to inform the
developers of the basis in the assets they acquire, much as an investor
could report his basis in stocks transferred to a new broker. 155 The
difficulty is that virtual-world participants may not report basis accu-
rately. Moreover, many developers prohibit the sale of items outside
the confines of their worlds and enforce the prohibition by banning
those who sell goods from their worlds. 156 Nonetheless, sales do oc-
cur, creating basis. In such cases, participants are unlikely to report
basis to the publisher, and it seems incongruous to require publishers
to create systems to track basis where their rules, if followed, would
prohibit the creation of basis in the first place. Obviously, such con-
153 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
154 I.R.C. § 1015 (providing that the donee holds the same basis in the property as the
donor did).
155 This method could work something like the hedging rules found in I.R.C.
§ 1221 (a) (7) and (b) (2) and the regulations issued to implement these sections. Under
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(f), taxpayers must identify whether a futures contract is a hedging
transaction or an investment by the close of business on the day it is acquired. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1221-2(f) (as amended in 2007). The regulations also contain rules for characterizing
transactions where no designation has been made. Id. § 1.1221-2(g)(2). Where no identi-
fication is made, the transaction is deemed not to be a hedging transaction. However, the
regulations contain rules for inadvertent failures to designate, id. § 1.1221-2(g) (2) (ii), as
well as anti-abuse rules, id. § 1.1221-2(g) (2) (iii), to prevent taxpayers from treating legiti-
mate hedging transactions as investments. Admittedly, the determination of basis can be
more difficult than the binary decision of whether a futures contract qualifies as a hedging
transaction or an investment. However, the basic structure of a designation requirement,
default rules absent a designation, and anti-abuse rules is a model that could prove fruitful.
156 See, e.g., Posting of Edward Castronova to TERRA NOVA blog, http://terranova.
blogs.com/terra-nova/2004/12/blizzard_goes_t.html (Dec. 12, 2004) (describing Bliz-
zard's efforts to police its no-cash-out rule).
[Vol. 95:283
TRACING BASIS THROUGH VIRTUAL SPACES
cerns do not apply to fully commodified worlds that permit partici-
pants to cash out.
Second, it may be possible to track basis without imposing a re-
porting requirement on publishers. Each virtual object is constructed
of code, and it would be possible to create each item with a tracking
feature that would store that item's basis and holding period. In a tax-
free world, whenever items were exchanged, the basis could automati-
cally transfer from one item to the other. Under this system, if Grant
were to spend coins from a commingled fund, the coins would have
basis information encoded in them that would transfer to whatever
item he acquired. Then, if he sold the item in a taxable transaction,
he could simply check the item's basis to determine his gain or loss.
To make this work, taxpayers would have to be able to identify and
select which coins from a commingled fund they were using to
purchase items, much as one identifies lots when selling stock. Or,
one could adopt a forced-ordering rule where the coins could be se-
lected automatically.
To account for the fact that basis can arise even if in-world trans-
actions are not taxed, one could allow taxpayers to adjust manually
the basis of their items to reflect reality. This ability to set the basis
counter could also be used if tax authorities were to subject some or
all in-world transactions to taxation. Players would simply need to in-
sert the fair market value of the item received into the basis counter.
While this would allow people to fabricate basis, fraudulent behavior
is possible in virtually any system one creates and is really no different
from a taxpayer's opportunity to enter incorrect figures onto their tax
returns.
As with the basis reporting idea, this solution would require the
participation of both publishers and participants, as publishers would
have to structure their universes to require that all assets have basis
and holding period markers, allow those markers to be reset when
appropriate, and possibly to allow designation of currency from com-
mingled pools. Participants would have to enter basis information
when appropriate. Just as with mandatory reporting requirements, it
seems likely that developers and virtual-world participants would op-
pose this approach. Nonetheless, such an approach could make basis
tracing possible.
B. The Pooling Approach
The second approach to allocating basis in virtual worlds would
be to pool a taxpayer's basis in her virtual goods and allocate that
basis back to those goods based on their relative fair market values.
Just as an investor's interest in a company can be viewed as a unified
whole, a virtual-world participant's investment in a given virtual world
2010]
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could be seen as a unified whole. Unlike assorted investments in the
real world, investments in virtual assets are easily cabined and seen as
separate from other types of investments, making pooling attractive.
Someone who has a basis of $2,000 in virtual goods with a $3,000 value
has a $1,000 unrealized gain. As with fungible assets, it arguably
should not matter for tax purposes that the taxpayer purchased some
goods at one price and others at another. If the taxpayer cashes out
part of that investment, she should realize a proportional amount of
gain or loss.
Although this approach works well in the partnership and mu-
tual-fund context, it would likely be unduly difficult in the virtual-
world context. The reason that this method works in the mutual-fund
context is that all shares in a mutual fund have the same value. Thus,
one simply divides the total basis by the shares owned to determine an
average basis per share.157 It works in the partnership context be-
cause there are only two types of interests, and both types of interest
can easily be understood to be part of a unified interest in a business,
despite the differences. In contrast, aside from currency, virtual
goods are not fungible and do not have equal value. Thus, it does not
work to divide the total basis by the number of virtual assets owned to
determine the average basis of each virtual asset. Otherwise, a single
gold piece might have the same basis as a sword that costs 100 gold
pieces. 158
To make basis pooling work, it would be necessary to determine
the relative fair market value of each asset and to assign each asset
basis in accordance with such value. This determination is simply not
workable, as taxpayers would have to value all their virtual assets any-
time they sold one asset to determine how much basis should be, allo-
cated to the asset being sold. Although active markets exist for some
157 For example, if a taxpayer purchased 100 shares of a mutual fund for $10/share
and a second 100 shares for $20/share, the total basis for all shares would be $3000, and
the average basis/share would be $15. If the taxpayer sold 50 shares, those shares would
each have a basis of $15 for a total basis of $750. The remaining 150 shares would have a
basis of $2250, or $15/share.
158 Allocating basis in this fashion would open the door to serious manipulation, as it
would create losses in some assets and gains in others. For instance, continuing the exam-
ple in the text above, assume that the taxpayer purchased the gold piece for $0.10 and the
sword for $100. The total pooled basis would then equal $100.10. If this basis were divided
equally between the gold piece and the sword-the only two assets the taxpayer owned-
the gold piece would get $50.05 in basis, as would the sword. The taxpayer could sell the
gold piece to generate a loss, while holding onto the gain property. In this hypothetical, it
seems likely that that the loss would not be allowed under I.R.C. § 165(c), which places
strict limitations on loss deductions. See I.R.C. § 165(c). However, if participating in a
virtual world is considered an activity covered under I.R.C. § 183, the loss might be allowed
to offset a gain from that activity, so long as it occurred in the same tax year. See id. § 183.
Also, it is not difficult to imagine someone in Second Life or some other virtual world
engaged in a profit-seeking activity, where such a deduction would be allowed under either
I.R.C. § 162 or § 212.
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assets in some worlds, and it might be possible to derive value indi-
rectly, basis pooling, at least done this way, is not administratively
feasible.159
One could try to remedy the allocation problem by giving taxpay-
ers no basis in virtual goods other than virtual currency and then pool-
ing the basis in such currency. 160 Let us return to Grant to illustrate
how this would work. If Grant were to purchase a sword for $100, the
$100 basis would attach to any currency Grant had. Thus, when Grant
sells the sword for $100, he must report a $100 gain. If Grant has no
currency, the basis would sit in suspense until he acquired some. 161
When Grant cashes out his currency, it would be easy to determine
the average basis, as currency is fungible. We could simply divide the
total basis by the units of currency.
While initially promising, at least from the basis allocation per-
spective, this approach also has its problems. For instance, if Grant
were to purchase a sword for $100 and then sell it the next day for
$100, he would have no accession to wealth. However, he would have
to report a gain of $100.162 If we assume that Grant has one gold
piece that he found in-world to which his basis flows, Grant will realize
a loss of almost $100 if he sells the gold coin for $0.10, its fair market
value. However, if the loss is deemed personal, it will be disallowed
159 It should be noted that basis is averaged across nonfungible partnership interests,
see supra Part III.A.1, and across nonfungible classes of stock received in a transaction
covered by I.R.C. § 351, see supra Part III.B. However, in the partnership context, there
are only two types of interests to be valued, making the allocation relatively easy. Incorpo-
rations are normally accomplished with the help of lawyers who should be versed in these
matters and capable of advising their clients regarding basis allocations. The same cannot
be said of sales of virtual assets.
160 I'd like to thank Bryan Camp for suggesting this as a possible solution.
161 The issue of disembodied basis arises in the context of corporate redemptions that
are treated as dividends, where the corporation has redeemed shares, but shareholders
should nonetheless be accorded the basis they have in those shares. If the shareholder has
other shares that have not been redeemed, the basis transfers to those shares. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.302-2(c), ex. I (as amended in 2007). If the shareholder has no additional shares
but is treated as having received a dividend because shares owned by others are attributed
to him, the basis should shift to those shares. See id. § 1.302-2(c), ex. 2. Presumably, one
could have free-floating basis, unattached to any object, that could be recovered at some
later date or that could attach to later acquired assets. The Treasury Department has sug-
gested something similar to this in Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.302-5, which permits
basis to be recovered on a date other than the redemption date. See Allocation of Consid-
eration and Allocation and Recovery of Basis in Transactions Involving Corporate Stock of
Securities, 74 Fed. Reg. 3509 (proposed Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
162 I have proposed elsewhere that income generated in in-world transactions should
not be subject to tax if the world prohibits participants from cashing out. See Chodorow,
supra note 3. If the nontaxation of such transactions is warranted because of the inability
to cash out, stripping a participant of her basis on cashing out may serve as an added
deterrent to cashing out, thus further justifying nontaxation of in-world transactions. In-
deed, to the extent that taxation is seen as appropriate, but not feasible because of admin-
istrative concerns, stripping goods of basis when they are cashed out may serve as a form of
rough justice.
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under I.R.C. § 165(c), thus causing him to report a $100 tax gain,
even though he is no better off.1 6 3
If the loss is incurred in an activity covered by I.R.C. § 183, it may
be used to offset gain from the activity. Section 183, colloquially
known as the hobby-loss provision, applies to any activity that does not
qualify as a trade or business under I.R.C. § 162 or a profit-seeking
activity under I.R.C. § 212. For such activities, taxpayers may deduct
expenses to the extent of gains, thus preventing the double taxation
of funds expended on those activities. However, because there are no
carryover provisions, if the sale of the sword and the coin were to oc-
cur in different tax years, the loss would not be available to offset the
gain. Similarly, as discussed above, if Grant sold the gold coin to a
related party, the loss would be disallowed. 164 Thus, Grant would be
taxed on a phantom $100 gain.
In addition to the problem of phantom gain, causing all basis to
flow to a taxpayer's virtual currency would create some assets with
built-in gains and others with built-in losses. Because taxpayers have
the ability to hold their gain property and sell their loss property, this
could create significant opportunities for taxpayers to cause their tax
results to deviate from their economic results, something pooling is
supposed to prevent.
Steven Chung has suggested that virtual currencies that function
as real-world currencies could be treated as such for tax purposes and
that participants in virtual worlds with such currencies could be sub-
jected to the foreign currency rules found in I.R.C. § 987.165 Busi-
nesses covered by § 987 calculate their foreign taxable income in the
foreign currency and then translate it into a dollar gain or loss using
the weighted average exchange rate over the taxable year. 166 When
they transfer money from the foreign unit to the United States, ex-
changing it into U.S. dollars, they calculate an exchange gain or loss,
i.e., the difference between their basis in their foreign currency and
the value received, using a pooling method similar in some regards to
those discussed above.
Under the proposed regulations, the taxpayer determines an "eq-
uity pool" and a "basis pool" for the business, where the equity pool
reflects the business's adjusted, undistributed foreign currency earn-
163 Under the Haig-Simons income definition, whether someone is deemed better off
is determined by looking at the sum his consumption and change in wealth. See GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 80, at 97. One could argue that Grant is better off because, even
though Grant's wealth has not increased, the purchase of the sword can be viewed as an act
of consumption. I would argue that the purchase of the sword is merely a change in the
form of his wealth.
164 I.R.C. § 267 (2006).
165 See Chung, supra note 3, at 763.
166 I.R.C. § 987(1), (2).
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ings and profits and the basis pool reflects the previously taxed invest-
ment in the business. 167 When a remittance is made, the taxpayer
determines what percentage of the equity pool the remittance repre-
sents and allocates to it the same percentage of the basis pool. Gain
or loss arises if the value of the remittance differs from the basis, and
it is treated as ordinary, not capital.
Although this approach would simplify gain or loss calculations
for in-world taxable transactions by requiring only one conversion at
the end of the year, it amounts to a pure pooling proposal when in-
world transactions are tax free. Virtual-world participants are just as
likely to cash out property as they are currency. As noted above, allo-
cating pooled basis to nonfungible items is quite problematic. Even
absent those concerns, Chung concedes that the administrative diffi-
culties for those participating for entertainment may be onerous. 168
C. A Hybrid Approach
Neither a pure tracing nor a pure pooling approach to virtual
basis seems particularly promising. Tracing is simply too administra-
tively burdensome and ignores the fungible nature of currency. Pool-
ing has its own administrative difficulties. In light of these problems, I
propose a hybrid approach, where virtual goods retain their own cost
basis, while basis is averaged across virtual currency. When an asset is
sold in-world for virtual currency, the basis from the asset flows into
the currency pool. It is then available to be allocated to items pur-
chased with that currency or to offset the amount realized if the cur-
rency is cashed out. Although this approach does not solve all of the
difficulties of accounting for basis, it avoids many of the administrative
problems pure tracing or pooling regimes present and it properly dis-
tinguishes between fungible and nonfungible assets.
This proposal would work as follows. Any tax-free barter ex-
change of assets in-world would be treated as a tax-free exchange to
which the tracing regime applied, i.e., the basis of the item given up
would transfer to the item received. Rules would need to be devel-
oped to address the exchange of multiple items of different value and
bases to prevent taxpayers from manipulating the basis rules by claim-
ing they had exchanged low-value items for high-value items. If Grant
were to purchase a sword for $100 and then sell it the next day for
$100, he would not have to report any gain or loss, as he would retain
a $100 basis in the sword. Similarly, if he traded the sword for a
shield, he could sell the shield for $100 without incurring any tax lia-
bility because the basis would transfer to the shield. However, if Grant
167 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.987-2(c).
168 See Chung, supra note 3, at 776-77.
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were to sell the sword for virtual currency, the virtual currency would
then acquire the $100 basis. This basis would then be pooled with
that of any other currency Grant has.
Any asset purchased with virtual currency would receive a basis
equal to the proportional basis inherent in the pool, regardless of
which coins were actually used in the purchase. In essence, this rule is
the flip side of the basis-pooling rules allowed in the sale of mutual
funds.169 Such a rule would obviate the need to track different
batches of currency and trace the basis from specific coins in a pooled
fund to different virtual items Grant purchases, while at the same time
ensuring that Grant is not taxed absent real economic gain. The rule
also avoids the need to value nonfungible property to allocate pooled
basis.
An example might help. Imagine that Grant earns 1000 gold
coins in-world, which are not taxed and therefore have no basis. Fur-
ther assume that he purchases a sword for $100, which he later sells
for 1000 gold pieces. Each of these gold pieces has a $0.10 basis.
Next assume that Grant purchases a shield for 700 gold pieces, which
he later sells for $70. Rather than determine which gold pieces Grant
used to purchase the shield to determine his basis and therefore his
gain or loss, under this approach we would need to determine his
average basis for the 2000 gold pieces at the time of the purchase and
then allocate the appropriate amount to the shield. Here, the total
basis is $100, and therefore each gold coin has a $0.05 basis. Because
Grant used 700 coins to purchase the shield, the shield gets a basis of
$35. Thus, he must report a $35 gain on its sale. The remaining 1300
gold pieces have an aggregate basis of $65, with each coin having a
$0.05 basis.
Still unanswered is the question whether the basis should be uni-
fied or fragmented. Given the administrative difficulties of tracing ba-
sis fragments and determining gain or loss for them, I propose a
unified basis approach. However, as in the mutual-fund context, the
holding period for any asset purchased with the pooled coins or for
the coins themselves must be addressed. One could follow either the
fragmented-holding period approach used for I.R.C. § 351 transac-
tions, or the ordering approach used for mutual-fund sales. Under
the fragmented approach, any gain or loss would need to reflect the
relative percentage, based on fair market value, of various holding pe-
riods of the coins in the common pool used to purchase a virtual as-
set.170 This approach could get complicated if there are numerous
batches of gold coins with different holding periods, and it would
169 See supra Part III.A.2.
170 See supra Part IlI.B.
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functionally eliminate any benefit gained from unifying basis. Thus,
one of the ordering rules used for mutual fund sales seems desirable.
The double-category method allows for long-term and short-term
pools so that the holding periods can be maintained separately. 171
However, this approach seems unnecessarily complicated for the vir-
tual-world context. Instead, using the single-category mutual-fund ap-
proach, FIFO applies, such that the longest held coins are deemed to
be spent first.172 If there are sufficient coins in the pool at the time an
item is purchased, all the gain or loss on the taxable sale of that item
would be deemed long-term. If the long-term coins are all used up,
then we deem the coins with a short-term holding period will be
spent, potentially leading to a fragmented holding period. However,
this fragmentation cannot be avoided.
Admittedly, this approach could lead to an odd result if a tax-
payer were to purchase an item for cash, sell it for gold pieces, repur-
chase the same item, and then sell it for the same amount of cash he
paid for it. For instance, Grant might buy a sword for $100 on IGE.
com, sell it for 1000 gold pieces in a tax-free transaction, then repur-
chase the sword for 1000 gold pieces, and sell the newly purchased
sword for $100. If the pooled basis of the currency reflects an unreal-
ized loss, the sale of the sword would lead to a tax loss even though
the taxpayer is even with regard to that item. If the pooled basis re-
flects an unrealized gain, the taxpayer will have a gain even though he
has not made money on the item. It looks like the tax and economic
results will deviate, something the pooling approach is supposed to
remedy.
However, on reflection, these results are not problematic. In the
loss scenario, when the taxpayer generates a tax loss, he has in fact
suffered an economic loss, as reflected in the pooled currency. He
could just as easily sell currency to realize the loss, and the fact that he
has done so instead through the transaction described above does not
present tax problems. In the gain scenario, the rule would force him
to recognize part of the gain accruing in other assets. While we gener-
ally avoid this when dealing with nonfungible goods, in the context of
virtual worlds, the recognition of gain seems less troubling because it
is easier to conceive of one's investment in a virtual world as a unified
whole, when compared to other types of investments.
CONCLUSION
Virtual worlds present a host of fascinating tax questions that, to
date, the IRS has not addressed. So far, those who have considered
171 Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(e)(3) (1960).
172 Id. § 1.1012-1 (e) (4).
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taxation in the context of virtual worlds have focused on the funda-
mental question of whether the tax laws do or should cover transac-
tions that occur solely in-world. This Article considers how best to
account for basis in virtual worlds, an issue that must be resolved re-
gardless of whether one taxes in-world transactions. As the National
Taxpayer Advocate noted in her recent report to Congress, a lack of
administrative guidance will likely lead to noncompliance in this and
other areas.173
Consideration of the basis-recovery rules found in the tax laws
reveals the instrumental nature of those rules and the role that histori-
cal contingency has played in the development of the law. The ap-
proaches generally break down into tracing and pooling, each
approach having its own advantages and drawbacks. Unfortunately,
neither would work particularly well in the virtual context. However,
given the instrumental nature of the basis rules, policymakers should
feel free to devise new rules applicable to this new context. I propose
that the IRS adopt a hybrid approach to basis accounting in virtual
worlds, where basis is traced for virtual items and pooled for currency,
thus taking the best of both approaches and balancing administrative
concerns with the conceptually accurate result for both nonfungible
and fungible assets.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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